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Abstract
The primary concern of this work is the substitution of co-referring names in 
belief ascriptions. Before an explanation of belief ascriptions is given, the development 
of direct reference is considered with some advance on the character of proper names. 
Attention is paid to relevant philosophical developments leading to the espoused view.
Frege claimed that there is a distinction between the sense and reference proper 
names. This is considered as well as what Frege put forward with regards to indirect 
speech. Then I discuss Kripke’s response to Frege, and similar theories. With the 
descriptive theories of naming considered inadequate, a new account of how names 
refer is given through Kripke’s picture of reference based on reference sharing. 
Reference sharing is further developed in line with Gareth Evans’s name-using 
practices.
Out of the Kripkean picture developed direct reference. Any theory of direct 
reference is a theory that claims that the semantic content of a directly referential term 
is simply its referent. David Kaplan gave an account of direct reference using 
indexicals and demonstratives as a paradigm. His account showed that there are two 
types of meaning, character and content, where character is the linguistic meaning and 
content is the semantic meaning of a term. It is shown that Kaplan’s distinction is clear 
for indexicals, but his claim that character and content collapse into reference for proper 
names is unsatisfactory. A new and more radical account of character is then given for 
proper names. It is maintained that proper names are directly referential, so the content 
of a name is its referent, but its character is a function from name-using practice to 
referent. This account is developed in contrast to the view of Recanati.
Direct reference gives a natural explanation of ordinary assertions, but is often 
considered problematic in belief attributions. Since the semantic content of a name is 
its referent, co-referring names should be substitutable salva veritate in all sentences.
In belief attributions this is counter-intuitive. Kripke’s discussion of this puzzle is 
considered to show that this is a problem for any theory of reference. After considering 
the problem for a theory of names, pragmatic solutions are considered, particularly the 
theories of Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon. Soames’s view is shown unsatisfactory 
as it does not explain belief toward singular propositions, and can give the intuitively 
wrong truth-value for some veridical propositional attitudes. Salmon claims that belief 
is really a ternary relation between individuals, propositions, and modes of 
apprehension with propositions. He then claims that speakers cannot express this 
ternary relation, but “fake it” through pragmatics. This view is rejected in the hope of 
developing an account of belief that is consistent with direct reference and 
psychological accounts, but does not require speakers to fake it.
In my account different ways of believing a proposition are given in value 
assigned logical forms. Value assigned logical forms give the metaphysics of belief as 
a binary relation. Substitution of co-referring terms is possible in belief attributions so 
long as it does not change the value assigned logical form of the belief attribution. An 
account is then given which explains behaviour when such contradictory beliefs are 
rationally held. It is also explained why there is hesitation to make substitutions in 
belief attributions and why it is more appropriate for speakers to use certain words over 
others in belief attributions.
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1. Frege’s Picture
Introduction
When speakers attribute de re beliefs to one another it is generally done in such 
a way that the words used in the sentence are relevant to the belief held. If I say ‘Alice 
believes that Martha is coming over for dinner’, I attribute the belief to Alice that 
Martha is coming over for dinner. If Martha also goes by the name ‘Eleanor’ and Alice 
does not know this, it might be, and has been, claimed that I cannot substitute ‘Eleanor’ 
for ‘Martha’ in the belief attribution. Even though both names refer to the same person, 
for some, there is reluctance to make substitutions. In cases such as this, the intuition is 
to deny substitution and claim that such a substitution would make the sentence false. 
This intuition is one of the reasons that led to Gottlob Frege’s distinction between sense 
and reference.
The Sense Reference Distinction
In his famous essay, “On Sense and Reference” (1892), Frege presents his 
theory of sense and reference for singular terms and sentences. 1 In this work, Frege set 
out to show why ’ seems to differ from ‘0 =6 ’ where ‘a’ and ‘6 ’ both refer to the 
same object. Frege thought that there must be a difference between statements ta=b> 
and ‘a=cC\ he claimed that <‘a=d> differs in cognitive value from ‘a=b\ since 'a-a'' is 
analytic and knowable a priori while ta=bi seems to be an informative statement. Frege 
saw this problem as the question of how *=’ should be analysed (p. 151).
Frege initially saw two possibilities for analysing *=’. The identity sign could be 
understood either objectually or metalinguistically. On the objectual account, *=’ is a 
relation between that which is designated by ‘a ’ and ‘6 ’, so *a=b ’ cannot differ from
1 In Beaney (1997) under the name “On Sinn and Bedeutung”
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ta=a\ where ‘0 =6 ’ is true, because the objects designated by both ‘0 ’ and ‘6 ’ are one 
and the same (p. 151). Here, ‘0 =6 ’ would be an a priori truth since ‘0 =0 ’ is 0  priori and 
‘0 =6 ’ would have the same content. Frege did not see this as possible since he claimed 
that it is informative and learning that 0  is identical to b could be valuable information 
not able to be gained by reflection on ‘0 =0 ’ alone. An objectual interpretation does lead 
to identity statements being 0  priori; this is not what Frege wanted, nor is it what he 
thought was the intuitive way such an identity statement is taken.
Previously, Frege thought that when we see an identity statement we want to say 
that it expresses that ‘0 ’ and ‘6 ’ both designate the same object. Here, *=’ stands for a 
relation between signs instead of objects and is metalinguistic (p. 151). Although this is 
the way Frege originally thought we should think of identity, it cannot be completely 
correct. For, if this is what is expressed by identity statements then the objects are no 
longer the subject matter, but it is instead the names that are under consideration (p.
152). Though this was Frege’s earlier view, he felt that it could not be correct either, 
and completely rejects it in “On Sense and Reference” because an identity statement 
like ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is a statement of astronomy and says something about an 
astronomical object not a metalinguistic relation. This forces Frege to return to the 
objectual interpretation about which he had misgivings (p. 152).
Having to choose between two equally problematic interpretations of identity 
statements led Frege to believe that there must be a new solution.2 Interpreting identity 
objectually led to identical cognitive values for ‘0 =6 ’ and ‘0 =0 ’. Frege, however, 
thought that there must be a difference in the cognitive value of these statements. Frege 
saw a difference that he thought would solve the problem:
2 For discussion of, and debate regarding, Frege’s view on the objectual versus metalinguistic see Caplan 
and Thau (2001) and Heck (2003). Caplan and Thau defend the claim that Frege never rejects the 
metalinguistic interpretation o f identity. Richard Heck responds to that claim.
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A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a 
difference in the mode of presentation of the things designated, (p. 152)
Frege made a distinction between the object designated and the mode of presentation of
that object, this distinction is between the reference and sense of referring expressions.3
The reference is that which the sign designates. The sense is wherein the mode of
presentation is contained (p. 152). This distinction marks Frege’s philosophy and is
used throughout his philosophy of language.
The relation between sense and reference is a many-one relation. For any one
reference can have many senses. The same object can be presented in different ways at
different times. For an individual to grasp a reference, it must be by way of some mode
of presentation, which Frege claimed was a public feature of a name though two
speakers might not share the same sense. He said that anyone who is familiar with the
language grasps the sense of a proper name (p. 153). It must be clarified that Frege uses
‘name’ in such a way that it covers all singular terms, not just proper names as the term
is often used. Additionally, Frege goes on to include any well-formed sentence as a
singular term because it refers to a truth-value (p. 153). Frege felt that any expression
referring to an object is a name for that object. For any person to use a name and
understand the name she must grasp the sense of the name.
Which sense of a proper name the speaker grasps is irrelevant, so long as it 
determines the correct reference. With each referring expression there corresponds at 
least one sense. Frege gives the example of lines a, b, and c, each connecting the 
vertices of a triangle to their opposite midpoints. Lines a, b, and c intersect at the same 
point. This point can be referred to by ‘the intersection of a and b’ or by ‘the 
intersection of b and c \  Both expressions refer to the same point, but refer to it in
3 ‘Reference’ is left untranslated in the Black translation and appears throughout as ‘Bedeutung’. I will 
use ‘reference’ throughout unless it appears within a quote.
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different ways. So, there are different modes of presentation for the one point; each
mode of presentation being a different sense for the same reference.
The reference of a name can appear under different senses, or modes of
presentation. There is an indefinite number of senses for any given reference. As was
previously stated, the relation between sense and reference is many-one. Sense
determines reference, or sense will take a person to the reference, but one cannot go
from the reference to the sense:
Comprehensive knowledge of the Bedeutung [reference] would require us to be 
able to say immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such 
knowledge we never attain, (p. 153)
Complete knowledge of the reference can never be obtained, so one cannot determine
whether or not just any sense belongs to a given reference. One must see what
reference is determined by the sense.
Sense and Reference of Declarative Sentences
With the distinction between sense and reference in place, Frege gave an analysis
for proper names that he could then apply to all singular terms.
A proper name (word, sign, combination of signs, expressions) expresses its 
sense, stands fo r  [bedeutet] or designates [bezeichnet] its Bedeutung. By 
employing a sign we express its sense and designate its Bedeutung. (1892, p. 
156)
Since Frege saw sentences as singular terms in the same way as ordinary proper names, 
he goes on to apply his theory of sense and reference to declarative sentences. A 
sentence will express a thought, which Frege took not as the subjective content, but 
objective content shared by different speakers (p. 156n). The thought cannot be the 
reference of a sentence, for when two co-referring expressions, having different senses, 
are substituted in a sentence the thought changes. But the reference cannot change 
because the two expressions are co-referential. Since Frege saw sentences as singular
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terms, by substituting one name for another in a sentence the sentence changes creating 
a new singular term for the reference of the sentence. The creation of a new singular 
term for the reference means that there will be a new sense, and because the sense of the 
sentence is a thought, there will be a new thought. Frege’s test for such a change in 
thought was whether or not an individual could hold different attitudes toward the 
thought expressed by a sentence, and the thought expressed by a sentence differs only 
by substituting a co-referring name. Though substitutions can be made in a sentence and 
different thoughts could be expressed, such a change cannot affect the reference of the 
sentence. An individual can take different attitudes toward the thoughts expressed by 
such substitutions, and Frege tacitly assumes that one person cannot take different 
attitudes toward the same thought, so the substitution of terms with different senses, but 
same reference, changes the thought of the sentence. Because of this, Frege concludes 
that the thought expressed by a sentence is the sense of the sentence not its reference (p. 
156). The sense of the sentence is made up of the senses of the parts of the sentence. 
The sense of a referring expression in a sentence is part of the sense of the sentence, i.e. 
its thought.
Since the sense of a sentence is the thought that sentence expresses, that means 
something else must be the reference. For Frege, the reference of a sentence is its truth- 
value. Frege comes to this by, again, considering the substitution of co-referring terms. 
Substitution has already resulted in different thoughts, so there must be something that 
remains the same when one co-referring name is substituted for another. In the sentence 
‘2+1=3’, the numeral ‘2’ can be replaced by ‘(1+1)’ since both are names for 2. Frege 
saw that the only thing that remained the same in such a substitution is the truth-value 
(1914, p. 233). Though two names may have different senses, when one name replaces 
the other in a sentence the truth-value remains the same. Truth is not predicated on
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sentences, but is the reference of a sentence. Sentences refer to the True or to the False. 
The truth of a sentence depends on the references of its parts determined by the senses 
of the parts. In this way, the sense of the sentence determines the truth-value, but the 
truth-conditions depend on the references of the parts. All sentences that express true 
thoughts refer to the True, and all sentences expressing false thoughts refer to the False.
Within the Fregean framework, a name can be substituted for another with the 
same reference salva veritate. Two names may have different senses, but so long as the 
reference is the same the names can be substituted while maintaining truth-value. When 
this occurs the thought expressed will be altered, but since both terms refer to the same 
object the reference of the sentence remains the True or the False depending on the 
original sentence. ‘Cicero’ in the sentence ‘Cicero was an orator’ can be substituted by 
‘Tully’ without a change in truth-value. ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ have different senses, but 
are both names for the same individual. When the truth-condition is set, it will depend 
on the references that are determined by the sense of each name. Since the senses for 
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ both determine the same object the truth-conditions will be the 
same, and therefore the reference will be the same, True.
Indirect Speech
Languages do not comprise sentences that are only subjects and one place 
predicates. There are complex sentences with subordinate clauses that present problems 
for Frege’s theory as he states it. He realised that subordinate clauses present a problem 
for his theory, so he devoted a large portion of “On Sense and Reference” to subordinate 
clauses. Within many subordinate clauses, substitution of co-referring terms, or 
sentences, seems to fail. Consider the sentence ‘Nathan said that Cicero was an orator’. 
If the subordinate clause of this sentence is considered a sentence that can be substituted 
for another sentence with the same reference, then any sentence referring to the True
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can be substituted into the subordinate clause. This is not correct. There are 
innumerable sentences that refer to the True that Nathan never uttered. When the 
subordinate clause is maintained, but the name appearing in the clause is substituted 
with a co-referring term, the reference of the subordinate clause is the same. But this 
does not express the same thought, and therefore the entire sentence is false even though 
a name with the same reference is substituted. As stated, something is not right with the 
Fregean conception for indirect speech. Aware of this, Frege makes a serious change to 
his system by claiming that within indirect discourse the reference to the subordinate 
clause is not a truth-value.
When a speaker uses indirect speech she wants to say something about a thought 
not a truth-value. Frege claims that within indirect speech there is a shift of reference. 
The words in the subordinate clause no longer have their customary reference, but have 
an indirect reference. The reference shifts from the customary reference to the indirect 
reference, which is the customary sense (1892, p. 154). Each word has a customary 
sense and reference and an indirect sense and reference. The customary sense is just the 
sense that is associated with the word, and the customary reference is the reference of 
the term. In indirect speech, the reference shifts to the customary sense. The new 
reference of a term in indirect discourse is its customary sense.
The introduction of indirect reference to subordinate clauses allows Frege’s 
theory to handle and explain what happens in indirect speech. When a speaker ascribes 
an attitude to an individual, the subordinate clause does not refer to a truth-value, but 
instead to the sense of the clause, i.e. its thought (p. 162). In the case of belief, Frege 
claims that it is the thought that is believed, so the thought of the subordinate clause 
should be relevant to the truth-condition of the entire sentence. As we have seen, in 
subordinate clauses it is not permissible to substitute expressions with the same
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customary reference. This is because the expression does not have its customary 
reference; it has its indirect reference, since the discussion is regarding thoughts instead 
of objects. In order to make a substitution in indirect discourse, it is not sameness of 
customary reference, but indirect reference, i.e. customary sense, which must be 
satisfied to allow substitution.
When Frege expounded on propositional attitudes, he focused on indirect 
reference, while neglecting indirect sense, which is important to the Fregean account. 
Frege did not make it clear what the indirect sense of a name is. He explains indirect 
reference, but stops his comments with that. As was stated above, one cannot go from 
reference to sense without comprehensive knowledge of the reference. Frege gives a 
proper explanation of the indirect reference of a name, but not the indirect sense. 
Because sense determines reference, and the converse is not true, there is no way to go 
from reference to sense. Thus, there is now no way to determine the indirect reference 
since there is no sense given for determining the indirect reference. Without an indirect 
sense it is also unclear what thought is expressed by a sentence containing indirect 
speech.
Dummett warns that there is a need for an indirect sense, and we come to the idea 
of an indirect sense because there must be something that determines the new reference 
(1973, p. 267-268). Though there is no way to go from reference to sense we do know 
that the indirect reference is the customary sense. Dummett wants to say that the 
indirect reference is determined by the customary sense. He claims that sense of a word 
does not vary but remains the same in indirect speech (1973, p. 268). Senses do not 
change. When a word is used in indirect speech, it maintains its customary sense, so the 
indirect sense of a name is the same as the customary sense. In this way, the thought 
expressed by the subordinate clause will be the same as if it were to appear as a single
sentence, but the reference of that thought will be a thought instead of a truth-value. 
Dummett goes on saying that it is by grasping the sense of a word that someone 
understands the word within the sentence it appears.
Dummett’s explanation of indirect sense tries to explain what is going on, but it 
deviates from the nature of the sense of an expression. He claims that the customary 
sense of name is the same as its indirect sense. This response deviates from the practice 
of senses set out by Frege and their use in ordinary language. It is not clear from Frege 
what the indirect sense of a name is. Dummett tries to make his solution fit what is 
going on within the context of indirect discourse, but it is not clear how this can be 
done. Every object will have a mode of presentation; this includes senses when senses 
are used as reference in indirect speech. To avoid having a regress of senses, Dummett 
maintains the expressions have their customary senses in indirect speech, but claiming 
that the indirect sense is the customary sense requires direct acquaintance with senses. 
Dummett makes the ad hoc move of claiming that we can directly refer to senses 
instead of those senses having senses. In order to remain consistent with Frege’s view, 
for a sense to be the reference, it must itself have a sense. It is because senses have 
senses that we can talk about senses as reference and refer to them. In order for 
Dummett to maintain his claim, he must assume that there can be direct reference and 
acquaintance to senses. This is far from anything supported by Frege. If we can have 
direct acquaintance with senses, as objects, the idea of sense is lost. There are now 
some objects that require a sense and others that do not. Given Frege’s view on 
arguments and functions, if a sense can determine a truth-value or a sense, there is 
nothing stopping the argument of a belief function from being a truth-value instead of a 
thought, returning us to the original problem. There will be no way to determine what 
the referent of the subordinate clause is and in turn no way to determine the truth-
9
condition. Even though there is initially some appeal to the claim that the reference of a 
subordinate clause is a thought, this Fregean conception is problematic.
10
2. The Kripkean Response to Descriptivism
What is Kripke Arguing Against?
Though some made alterations to the Fregean theory, some form of 
descriptivism, as it might be called, dominated the conception of proper names. There 
were some that, though trained in the Fregean tradition, were beginning to depart from 
that idea of proper names. Ruth Marcus (1962) was one of the first to criticise the 
Fregean view, but later Saul Kripke elucidated arguments against the Fregean model 
and is often credited with presenting defeating arguments against it. In his now famous 
lectures Naming and Necessity (1981), Kripke gave arguments against the Fregean 
model and presented some observations that he made regarding names and reference. 
Kripke was hesitant to limn his view as a theory, since most theories end up being 
wrong, but Kripke did present heterodox views that challenged the views of many 
analytical philosophers.
Though it is important to see Naming and Necessity as challenging Fregeanism, 
Kripke’s arguments were not directed at any one theory, but when Kripke presents his 
arguments against descriptivism he focuses on cluster theories.4 There are some, such 
as Searle (1958) and Strawson (1959), which move to a cluster theory since it is not 
clear that all name-users associate the same description, or sense. Cluster theories claim 
that an object must satisfy some, or the majority, of the cluster of descriptions related to 
a name in order to be the referent. This allows different speakers to each have different 
senses, but as long as the senses are each a substantial part of the same cluster, two
4 Although Kripke does focus his arguments against cluster theories, he does consider them as against 
Frege and Russell. It is important to note that Kripke gave Frege and Russell roughly the same theory. 
This is not completely correct. Russell holds the view that ordinary proper names are synonymous with 
definite descriptions, and logically proper names are directly referential (see CH. 4). Frege’s sense is not 
always a definite description, though in many cases it is. Even in cases where this is not so, senses and 
definite descriptions are functioning in the same way. This similarity allows Kripke to combine the 
theories.
11
speakers with different senses can communicate (Kripke, 1981 p. 31). The arguments 
that Kripke gives against descriptivism apply to Frege, Russell, and any cluster theory. 
Kripke focuses on the cluster theory since it seems to be a more viable option than a 
single description theory. It is immaterial to Kripke’s argument what form of 
descriptivism it is presented against. For any cluster of descriptions, the arguments can 
focus on any one description.
The Arguments
Against descriptivism Kripke presents three arguments. He gives a semantic 
argument, an epistemological argument, and the most discussed of the three, the modal 
argument (Soames, 2002 p. 19). Each of the three arguments presents compelling 
evidence that the content of a name is non-descriptive. Kripke’s hope is that he can 
support a Millian theory of names wherein names have denotation, but no connotation, 
i.e. names have reference, but no corresponding sense. Kripke’s arguments, based on 
the apparent ordinary use of names, aim to show that the meaning of a name is not a 
description.
Semantic Argument
The semantic argument is aimed at showing that the description associated with
a name may not always linguistically determine the correct reference; it shows basic 
descriptivist assumption to be incorrect. When a speaker uses a name, the description 
that is related to the name is a sufficient condition for determining the reference. For a 
name n, if an object satisfies the concept <p, which is associated with «, then that object 
is necessarily the referent of n. It is this assumption that gives the requirements for 
determining the reference of a name. For, according to descriptive theories, a name 
refers to an individual in virtue of the description, or sense, associated with that name.
12
When a speaker uses a name, the description associated with that name determines the 
referent, and in turn the truth-condition.
The assumption that names refer by way of a description can lead to problems 
for descriptivism, and this is what Kripke attacks with the semantic argument. 
Descriptions that are associated with a name by a speaker or group of speakers may not 
uniquely pick out the correct object. When a speaker uses a name she uniquely picks 
out an individual, but the unique satisfier of a description may be someone other than 
the intended referent. In this case, a name would refer not to the person the speaker 
wants to say something about, but the person satisfying the description or cluster of 
descriptions. This is not how speakers use names. Speakers intend to pick out an 
individual despite the description they, or the community, associate with the name.
Kripke gives clear examples of how reference can go wrong if it depends upon 
satisfaction of a description. A speaker may intend a specific individual as the referent 
of a name, but the description associated with that name might pick out the wrong 
person or in some cases no one. Consider ‘Godel’. Godel, we believe, discovered the 
incompleteness of mathematics, and assume this is the description associated with 
‘Godel’. What if the users of ‘Godel’ are mistaken and it was actually Schmidt that 
discovered the incompleteness of mathematics? On the description theory, now, and on 
all past occasions, every time ‘Godel’ is used it refers not to Godel, but instead to 
Schmidt because Schmidt uniquely satisfies the description ‘the discoverer of the 
incompleteness of mathematics’ (Kripke, 1981, p. 83). Moreover, this also leads to a 
problem in expressing ‘Godel did not discover the incompleteness of mathematics’, 
since in this case ‘Godel’ refers to Schmidt and comes out false if Godel did not 
discover the incompleteness of mathematics, because this would be the same as saying
13
that the discoverer of the incompleteness of mathematics did not discover the 
incompleteness of mathematics.
The example of ‘Godel’ is a hypothetical explanation of the semantic problem 
that could occur with descriptions as the semantic content of a name, but there are actual 
instances wherein the descriptions that are typically associated with a name are 
incorrectly attributed to the referent. Christopher Columbus is typically credited with 
being the first to think the Earth is round and being the first European to land in the 
western hemisphere. If either of these descriptions determine the reference of 
‘Columbus’, then descriptive theorists must claim that we refer to someone other than 
Columbus by ‘Columbus’. If the former description is associated with ‘Columbus’, the 
referent is likely to be some Greek, and if the latter then some Norseman (p. 85). What 
is worse is if someone associates the conjunct of the two descriptions, the term is now 
vacuous, because there is no unique reference. There is no unique satisfier of both 
descriptions so ‘Columbus’ has no extension, yet when speakers use ‘Columbus’ they 
do refer and say something true or false of a particular man.
There is no advantage made by appealing to a cluster theory instead of a single 
description theory, even though it is a stronger theory. The cluster theorist might claim 
that it is fine that the object does not satisfy the one description, for there are many 
descriptions associated with a name. So long as the referent satisfies most of the 
descriptions, then that object is the referent. It is easy to imagine cases where this could 
still go wrong. If all the information associated with an individual were wrongly 
attributed to that individual, then even the cluster theory would not determine the 
correct referent. Kripke makes a point about a case where this happened. It is thought 
by many scholars that the Biblical character Jonah was a real person, but most of the 
attributes given to him in the Biblical story are incorrect. In this case, since Jonah did
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not do those things, and if no one else did either, then ‘Jonah’ does not refer to anyone 
on the cluster theory, but if the scholars are correct it surely does.
Someone could also go on to exploit the way we use names. It could be that by 
‘Columbus’ I mean ‘the man commonly called ‘Columbus” . In some cases, this may 
be how we refer, or try to refer. As will be seen later, Kripke takes this idea and uses it 
as a basis for explaining how we refer. Simply stated, this is a circular account of 
reference. It does not go anywhere. To the question, ‘Who is Columbus?’ the response 
could be ‘the man called ‘Columbus” . But who is called ‘Columbus’? That is the man 
commonly called ‘Columbus’. Such an account could continue on. In order to develop 
this, there must be more than a metalinguistic account, because ‘called’ will mean the 
same as ‘referred to as’, so there is no explanation of reference.5
Epistemic Argument
The epistemic argument focuses on what is known or believed by the user of a
name when a speaker uses a name. The description associated with a name should be a 
priori, in that if a particular description ‘Z>’ is the semantic content of a name V ,  then a 
proposition expressed by a sentence such that the property of D is predicated on n 
should be a priori. However, in contrast, what someone who uses a name V  in a 
sentence knows is different from what is known by the same person substituting a 
description ‘the £)’ for V . A speaker can know a priori that ‘the D is £>’ expresses a 
true proposition, but the same speaker will not know a priori the proposition expressed 
by is D ’ even though semantically V  and ‘the Z>’ should be equivalent.
Equating the semantic content of V  and ‘the Z)’ means that knowledge of the 
identity should be a priori. In most cases, descriptive information related to a name can 
only be gained empirically. Predicative knowledge cannot be gained a priori. Kripke
5 As will be seen in chapter 3, Kripke gives a picture of reference that uses this idea in describing a 
situation of reference.
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gives the example of ‘Aristotle’. If ‘Aristotle’ meant the man who taught Alexander the 
Great, then ‘Aristotle taught Alexander the Great’ would be a tautology (1981, p. 30). 
Clearly this is not the case. There is no way that someone could come to the knowledge 
that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great without empirical data; such knowledge is a 
posteriori. The same is true of the previous example concerning ‘Godel’ and the 
incompleteness of mathematics (p. 87). Godel’s discovery of the incompleteness of 
mathematics is not a priori for anyone, except maybe Godel. Knowledge that an 
individual or object instantiates a particular property is not something that can be known 
a priori, contrary to what can be deduced from the descriptive theory.
Kripke does make the claim that in some very limited cases a speaker has a 
priori knowledge that a name has the same semantic content as a description. When the 
reference of a name is fixed by description, e.g. in the case of an initial baptism, it can 
be known a priori for the reference fixer that the referent of V  is D (p. 78). This will 
not be true for everyone, but limited to the person who fixed the reference by 
description. Kripke can grant that in some rare cases reference is fixed by description, 
instead of ostensively. However, this is not enough to support the descriptivist’s claim. 
Situations where the referent of a name is fixed by description might be cases where the 
reference fixer has a priori knowledge that n is D, since the reference of n is fixed by 
the description ‘the x : D x\ If this is a case where the description associated with a 
name is a priori, then it will only be a priori for the reference fixer. This limits those 
that have a priori knowledge of a uniquely identifying description for a name to a 
limited number of cases. Moreover, the cluster theorist is also not worried by this 
argument. Cluster theorists would not hold that any one description is associated with a 
name. Since there is a cluster of descriptions associated with a name no one 
description, or property, will be knowable a priori by all the name-users, so there is no
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reason to think that this leads to any a priori statements of predication. In these cases, 
Kripke does not need to be bothered, for the modal argument may defeat the 
descriptivist’s claim.
Modal Argument
The most well known and discussed of Kripke’s arguments against
descriptivism is the modal argument. The modal status of names is one of the overlying 
themes of Naming and Necessity. It is because of the modal status of names that Kripke 
was able to show that true identity statements containing names are necessary. He 
showed how we should make sense of transworld identity and its implications for 
essentialism. Kripke showed that names and descriptions act differently in modal 
contexts. In counterfactual situations, names and descriptions may differ in truth-maker 
and in turn differ in truth-value when evaluated at different possible worlds, or within 
different counterfactual situations. Truth-conditions in counterfactuals employing 
names may differ from descriptions because of Kripke’s neologism ‘rigidity’.
When dealing with counterfactual situations and identity across possible worlds, 
descriptivists questioned how the object is to be identified. Kripke felt this question 
was wrongheaded because names are rigid designators, a term Kripke introduced for 
discussing counterfactuals. A rigid designator is a singular term that designates the 
same object in every possible world (Kripke, 1981, p. 48). The question of transworld 
identity asks, “How do we identify Nixon in a possible world?” Kripke’s response is 
that there is no need to identify Nixon; we stipulate that the individual we are talking 
about is Nixon by using his name. Names are rigid designators, so when we speak 
counterfactually, using a name, about an individual in terms of possible worlds, the 
same individual is referred to in every possible world in which the individual exists.
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This stipulation is not just an idiosyncratic stipulation of Kripke, but is based on the 
way speakers use names when speaking counterfactually. By using a name in a 
counterfactual scenario, the object is identified by the use of the name-the same object 
as when the name is used in a scenario that is not counterfactual.
When an individual is considered in different possible worlds, we use a name 
that is rigid, and in every case refer to the same person. Since ‘George Bush’ is a rigid 
designator, we can ask if it could have been the case that George Bush6 was not elected 
to a second term as US president? In doing this, George Bush is the referent of the 
name even if in the envisaged scenario he did not go into politics nor has any of the 
same distinguishing features he actually has. Perhaps he was not even called ‘George 
Bush’. There is no need to try to find Bush in a possible world, i.e. determine which 
individual is George Bush. By using his name, he is identified and it is then decided 
whether or not certain actual situations might not have been instantiated. It is because 
names are rigid designators that it makes sense to ask if an individual might not have 
done such-and-such, which they did not actually do. The descriptivist cannot envisage a 
scenario in which the individual satisfies none of the descriptive information associated 
with the name. But in ordinary name usage we do this. We can say, ‘Aristotle might 
not have been bom in Stagira and might have died in infancy’. Since we can, and do, 
speak this way, names must be rigid designators.
Contrary to the way names are used, the descriptions cluster theorists give as the 
sense of names of people are typically not rigid designators. Some descriptions such as 
‘the element with atomic number 79’ and ‘H2O’ are rigid, but these descriptions use 
properties that are essential to the existence of the object and will be held by the object, 
uniquely, at every possible world where the object exists. Most descriptions associated
6 George W. Bush because George H. Bush was not elected to a second term.
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with an object do not contain essential properties. When a description is evaluated at 
different possible worlds there may be different individuals satisfying the description. 
Consider the description ‘The current prime minister of the United Kingdom’. At 
different times this description will pick out different individuals. At one time it 
denoted Winston Churchill, currently it denotes Tony Blair, and in the future it will 
denote someone else. So within the actual world some descriptions will be satisfied by 
different objects. When considered counterfactually, the same description may identify 
a different individual at the same time. It could have been the case that the current 
prime minister of the UK was Gordon Brown, and not Tony Blair. There will be 
counterfactual situations where the same object satisfies the description, but there will 
also be situations that could have been instantiated that do not denote the same person. 
Because of this, descriptions, such as these, are not rigid designators; descriptions can 
denote different objects in different counterfactual situations.
The descriptivist claims that names are synonymous with such (non-rigid) 
descriptions, but that cannot be the case since names are rigid designators. The referent 
of such a description changes in different counterfactual situations. But if names are 
non-rigid descriptions, then the truth-maker given by those names will differ at different 
possible worlds, and this is contrary to the way we use names in counterfactual 
contexts. For when speakers use a name in a counterfactual scenario they speak of the 
individual and ask whether or not that person might have been in such-and-such a 
situation. Assume that a description is correct at the actual world for an individual with 
a name V ,  i.e. overlook any complications that may arise from the semantic argument. 
Extensionally the truth-value will be the same both for ‘®«’ and the description in 
the actual situation. But when a counterfactual situation is considered, the object 
uniquely satisfying the description would be the relevant person, which might not be n
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(p. 6-7). Consider Kripke’s example of Aristotle, where it can be assumed that 
‘Aristotle’ and ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’ both refer to Aristotle. When 
‘Aristotle’ is considered descriptively and ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’ is evaluated at 
different possible worlds, it might have different truth-makers resulting in possibly 
different truth-values. In the actual world, Aristotle is the individual relevant to the 
truth-condition, but in some counterfactual situations it may be someone else that is 
relevant to the truth-condition, since Aristotle might not have gone into philosophy in 
that possible world (p. 7). Descriptions in counterfactual situations pick out who is 
relevant in the counterfactual scenario and that might not be the individual that the 
enquiry is made about.
There are many cases where the description that might be associated with a 
name is not instantiated by the individual in counterfactual situations. Aristotle and 
Hitler have very distinguishing characteristics, but they might not have had them. 
Aristotle’s most important properties are probably his famous works, but he might never 
have written them. Hitler’s most distinguishing property is probably his murderous 
political career, but he might never have gone into politics (p. 77). Since we can say 
that Aristotle might not have been a philosopher, or Hitler might not have ever gone 
into politics, names cannot be descriptions; otherwise, speaking counterfactually would 
result in speaking about someone else. As before, even if there is a cluster of 
descriptions associated with the names, the counterfactual referent might be different 
from the referent in the actual world. Consider all the famous deeds of Aristotle and 
Hitler that might be listed in a cluster theory. These might be a result of going into 
philosophy and politics, respectively. The envisaged scenarios, where Aristotle never 
went into philosophy and Hitler never went into politics, are ones in which Aristotle and 
Hitler do not satisfy any of the candidate descriptions. In order for names to reflect
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their use in counterfactual contexts, they cannot be non-rigid descriptions, nor clusters 
of non-rigid descriptions.
A Possible Counter to Kripke’s arguments
Those philosophers wanting to maintain a descriptive theory have tried to 
counter Kripke’s arguments. Counterexamples can be given where a name might refer 
by description, as we have seen, but these are not paradigmatic cases. Instances of 
names that are considered synonymous with descriptions are exceptions. There are still 
those that try to explain the phenomena that Kripke observed within a descriptive 
theory. The most contested is the modal argument. Responses have been put forward 
against the argument, but most end up as a specious attempt to give a descriptive 
analysis of names.
There is a distinction between rigid and non-rigid descriptions. A description 
can be made rigid by indexing it to a particular world. The use of an actuality operation 
in a description would rigidify a description. The object uniquely satisfying ‘the (p in 
the actual world’ would be the object denoted in other possible worlds. In this case, the 
description satisfies the requirement of rigidity such that it picks out the same individual 
in every possible world. The object is determined in each possible world by being the 
object uniquely satisfying the description of being (p in the indexed world. This seems 
to allow names to be rigidified descriptions, but still does not give an analysis that is 
consistent with names in modal contexts. Rigidified descriptions will denote the same 
object in every world in which it exists; ‘the x : actually Dx' will denote an object y  in a 
world w if and only if there is an object such that that object is the object that is D in the 
actual world. There will be worlds, w*f where ‘the x: actually Z)jc’ does not denote any 
object because there is no object satisfying the rigidified description. This differs from 
the way names are considered to refer in modal contexts. When we speak
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counterfactually, a name V  will still refer to n even if n does not exist in that possible 
world (Soames 2002, p. 41). However, if names are rigidified descriptions, then no 
object will satisfy the description. Consider the description ‘the actual inventor of 
bifocals’ as the rigidified description for Ben Franklin. Counterfactually, ‘Ben 
Franklin’ will still refer to Ben Franklin even if the circumstance of evaluation is a 
world, w*, in which Franklin does not exist, but i f ‘Ben Franklin’ is synonymous with a 
rigidified description, then at w* there is no one satisfying the relevant description.
This leads to there being no referent for ‘Ben Franklin’, and furthermore no truth- 
maker. This shows that even though descriptions can be rigidified and meet Kripke’s 
modal requirement, a rigidified description might differ from a name in reference at a
n
world where the description is not satisfied by any object.
Other attempts have been made challenging Kripke’s arguments, but for an 
account to be given that is successful, it must respond to all three of Kripke’s 
arguments. Attempts at refuting Kripke’s arguments are usually responses to the modal 
argument in isolation. This is because it is the strongest argument against descriptivism, 
but even if the above response was a cogent response to the modal argument, there are 
still the semantic and epistemological arguments. A descriptivist might give an 
argument in response to any one of Kripke’s arguments, but it is not likely that such a 
response will answer the aggregate of arguments. An argument that would save the 
descriptivist’s agenda would have to handle all three arguments, not just one; 
additionally, three individual arguments each directed at a single Kripkean argument 
will not do either. A response must consistently analyse names in such a way that it 
answers all of Kripke’s arguments. In this way, no purely descriptive analysis of names 
has been given, leaving descriptivism wanting.
7 For an analysis the World Indexed response and also the Wide Scope response (not mentioned here), see 
Soames (2002 p. 25-50) and Soames (1998).
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3. New Account of Reference: Referring without a
Description
Kripke’s picture of Reference
Kripke showed that in most cases names do not refer by way of a definite 
description. In doing this, it was left unclear how names refer to objects if not by 
description. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke presented a picture of how a name refers
g
to an object. He saw that there was a chain of communication between speakers. He 
then claimed that by using names speakers refer to objects through a chain of 
communication connecting them to the object.
The picture begins with someone engendering a name for an individual. This is 
what can be called an ‘initial baptism’. Typically, this occurs at or temporally close to 
birth where the child is given a name. The name is given to the child by ostensive 
definition. The parents may say, “We will call him ‘Charles’.” The parents assign a 
name to the child and refer to him by that name. Though this is common practice there 
are also instances where an individual acquires a second name such as a nickname. 
Often, those close to someone may use a nickname to refer to that individual. Charles 
may have the nickname ‘Chuck’, which is similar to ‘Charles’, or a nickname that 
differs from the original such as ‘Ruddagar’. The relation to the individual’s given 
name is immaterial; what is important is that the individual is given another name. Just 
as Charles’s parents gave him his name at birth, his friends also gave him a name, which 
they use to refer to him.
Initial baptism is only the beginning of the pattern of reference. The initial
baptism allows only those present when the name was assigned to Charles to use
8 Kripke’s idea comes from a footnote in Strawson (1959, p. 182). Kripke and Strawson differ in their 
requirements for reference sharing. For Strawson, a speaker must know from where the term was 
acquired in order to use it. For Kripke, it is the actual chain of communication that matters.
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‘Charles’ to refer to Charles. After an initial baptism, those that use the name ‘Charles’ 
are not limited to those present at the assigning of name. As with any newborn child, 
friends and family visit and the parents share the name with these individuals. The 
parents may say, “This is Charles” or “His name is ‘Charles’”, sharing the name with 
those that have come into contact with Charles. There will also be those that do not see 
Charles, but will interact with those that have. Through conversations the name is 
passed from link to link through the linguistic community. Those that have never seen 
Charles, but know his parents, or some other relevant individual, will acquire the name 
and use it to refer to Charles. Speakers acquire the term from other speakers without 
ever meeting Charles. Those speakers that have acquired the term can then use the 
name in other conversations to refer to Charles and pass the name on to others in the 
linguistic community creating new links in the chain of communication. The chain 
allows speakers far removed from Charles to refer to Charles without being able to 
uniquely identify him or know where the term was acquired (Kripke, 1981, p. 91). 
Those far removed from Charles and his family may not have any uniquely identifying 
information of Charles or the family, but they can still refer to Charles by ‘Charles’ 
because of the chain of communication linking their utterance containing ‘Charles’ to 
Charles.
The linguistic community is vital to maintaining reference and allowing others 
to acquire the term. Membership in that linguistic community where speakers passed a 
name from link to link creates a chain of communication linking a distant utterance of a 
name to the named individual (p. 91). Linguistic communities allow speakers to share 
reference for a name. Those outside a particular linguistic community are unable to use 
a name from that community to refer to the individual of the community without being 
initiated into the community. Those that are not members of the linguistic community
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cannot refer to Charles by ‘Charles’. The community forms the chain of 
communication linking the speaker to the referent. There is no one linguistic 
community for a language such as English, but many linguistic communities, wherein 
one speaker can be a member of any number of linguistic communities. Two speakers 
might be a part of the same linguistic community that uses ‘Gary’, but in two different 
linguistic communities for ‘Florence’, since they refer to different people when each 
uses the name ‘Florence’.
Referring to an individual through the links in a linguistic community requires 
more than the existence of the links. For Kripke, a speaker can forget where she first 
acquired a term, but reference can still be successful regardless of whether or not she 
remembers from whom, where, or when the term was first acquired (p. 93). If a speaker 
acquires a term, it does not matter where the term was acquired, just so long as it is used 
correctly. The correct use of an acquired term is what gives the chain of communication 
its strength. Just hearing a name via a link in the chain of communication is not enough. 
For a speaker to be credited with acquiring a term and referring to the referent, that 
speaker should typically intend, when she learns the name, to continue using it with the 
same reference as the speaker from whom she learned it (p. 96). The speaker cannot 
decide to use the name in a dissimilar way and still refer to the same object. The 
speaker might misunderstand the way a name is being used, i.e. she might think that the 
name is being used as in fiction when in reality the speaker were referring to an actual 
person, but in such cases, her intention was not to refer to an object or person, but she 
can still refer because her intention was to use the name in the same way. The speaker 
is not required to know where she acquired the term, although at first it is likely that she 
will be fully aware of where the term was learned. The speaker’s intention to use the 
name in the same way as the speaker from whom the name was learned is what secures
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the reference through the linguistic community. A speaker cannot learn a name and 
think it a good name for someone else and be credited with being a link in the chain. By 
intending to not use the name as others, but instead as a name for a pet, the speaker 
breaks her link in the chain of communication and cannot refer to the same individual as 
he from whom she learned the term. It is by being part of the community, which passes 
on a name through a chain of communication that a speaker can intend to share 
reference.9
The picture of reference given by Kripke replaces descriptions as determining
reference. In giving his picture of reference, Kripke was not giving a final theory on all
forms of reference, but one, of possibly many, paradigm examples of how speakers refer
by singular terms. Though some, but very few, names may refer by description,
Kripke’s chain of communication allows reference without identifying descriptions.
The reference of a name such as ‘The Big Bang’ or ‘Jack the Ripper’ might have been
fixed by description, but through the linguistic community these names can be used
without knowing those identifying descriptions. After his semantic argument, Kripke
needed to explain reference. By giving the chain of communication picture, he showed
how names refer while maintaining that they do not have descriptive content.
Although the picture presented seems clear it is not complete. Kripke says:
At any rate more refinements need to be added to make this even begin to be a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In that sense it’s not a theory, but is 
supposed to give a better picture of what is actually going on. (p. 96)
Though terse, Kripke focuses on two shortcomings in his picture, its incompleteness and 
the difficulty of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for it. Kripke shows 
the picture as incomplete by the example of ‘Santa Claus’. The name ‘Santa Claus’ has 
a chain of communication connecting the speaker to a historical saint, but that is not the
9 It will be shown in chapter 5 what is required to be a member o f a linguistic community.
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referent that reaches a child (p. 94). Kripke briefly says that this may be due to failure 
to intend to use the term to refer to the historical saint, but nevertheless, it is not 
explained by the theory. A more difficult problem for the picture is how to assign 
necessary and sufficient conditions, but it is not clear that this must be done. Kripke 
claims that any attempt at giving such conditions would be difficult, and if  it were done, 
the conditions would be complicated (p. 94). Though these conditions were not 
available to Kripke, it does not disprove the picture that he presented. Without 
necessary and sufficient conditions, it still seems true that through the connection of the 
linguistic community, leading back to the referent, we refer to a certain individual. This 
could be because there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. 
There are numerous different mechanisms in different kinds of cases. These problems 
do not invalidate Kripke’s picture, but they do show that it needs further development.
Beyond the shortcomings Kripke admitted, Gareth Evans (1973) saw what he 
felt to be greater problems. Just as in the ‘Santa Claus’ case, Kripke cannot explain 
reference shifts. For Evans, change in reference would be decisive against Kripke’s 
picture taken as a theory, since it cannot explain it. Evans gives the actual example of 
‘Madagascar’. ‘Madagascar’ originally referred to part of the mainland of Africa, but 
the term became corrupted. The term now refers to an island off the coast of mainland 
Africa. Explorers mapping the coast of Africa took some natives on their boat to give 
the names of locations. Unaware of the speed at which ships could travel, the natives 
were taken further out to sea than they thought. Upon reaching an island the explorers 
asked its name. The natives thinking they were still close to land said that it is called 
‘Madagascar’, but the way they usually used the name was to refer to the mainland.
The explorers went on their way leaving the natives on the mainland. The explorers 
intended to use the name to refer to the same place as the natives, but there was an
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unintended baptism, because the two sub-communities of the linguistic community for 
‘Madagascar5 went their own ways each differing linguistically and epistemologically. 
Kripke cannot explain which location is the referent of ‘Madagascar’. Is it the 
mainland, or is it the island? The chain of communication connects to both, so it is 
unclear which should be the referent. The example meets the criterion of Kripke’s 
picture. The explorers intended to use ‘Madagascar’ in the same way as the natives, but 
refer to the island instead, because of misinformation. According to Evans, Kripke 
cannot explain corruptions and shifts in reference.
The problems that Evans presents for Kripke’s picture show it to be inadequate, 
but Kripke was aware of this. Evans takes Kripke to be putting forward a theory, which 
Kripke would obdurately deny. Kripke claimed it was a picture of paradigm cases of 
reference not a complete theory. Examples such as ‘Madagascar’ are problematic, but it 
is an incomplete theory. It seems that a breakdown, or confusion, in speaker intention is 
responsible. Kripke does not give an answer, but one could be given if this picture was 
developed further. This is something that Gareth Evans decided to do (1982). He saw 
problems with the Kripkean picture, but saw potential in what Kripke presented.
Evans: Name-using Practices
In his chapter “Proper Names” in Varieties o f Reference (1982), Evans presents 
his view on how names refer. Though Evans, in some ways, disagrees with Kripke, 
there is overlap in the two theories and Evans uses some of the same ideas that Kripke 
used. The differences that arise are in Evans’s development of the theory. Evans takes 
the picture Kripke presented and develops it into a full theory. The advantage Evans’s 
theory has over Kripke’s is that he appeals to name-using practices. Evans’s name- 
using practices are an advancement on Kripke’s linguistic community; Evans uses these
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practices to show how names pass from one individual to another along with 
information. For Evans, the life and stages of a name-using practice bring about 
different phenomena in the way names are used.
In the same way that Kripke began his picture of reference, Evans has to allow 
names to begin somewhere. Evans begins his picture, like Kripke, with an initial 
baptism (Evans 1982, p. 376). However, when Evans elucidates his theory, he develops 
it in a way that differs from Kripke. Evans differs in his description of the community 
of language users. Name-using practices will have different members throughout the 
practice. Kripke allowed speakers far removed from the named individual to use the 
name and refer. Beyond referring, Evans focused on the information that existed in the 
community. Because of this, where Kripke made no division in the linguistic 
community that uses a name, Evans divided the name-using practice into two groups of 
name-users, the producers and the consumers. This division gives different name-users 
access to different information.
Producers are privileged, whereas the consumers are not, due to relations to the 
named individual. Consider a name-using practice for ‘Eve’ that began with an initial 
baptism. When Eve was bom her parents gave her the name ‘Eve’. In Kripke’s picture 
there were those that had contact with the individual. In the same way, there are those 
that have interactions with Eve, these individuals are the producers. The producers are a 
core group of speakers that are acquainted with Eve. Through their interactions with 
Eve they are able to re-identify her and assert, ‘This is Eve’. The producers in the 
name-using practice typically have dealings and interactions with Eve wherein they use 
the name ‘Eve’ and know her as Eve (p. 376). They know Eve and are able to identify 
her. Through their interaction with Eve, the producers gain information regarding her 
which they can then share with others. Due to their knowledge of Eve, producers are
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able to introduce new speakers into the practice by introducing them to Eve or by 
creating a link and sharing information with the inductee into the practice. At the 
earliest stages of a name-using practice all name-users are producers, since only those 
directly acquainted with the individual will have acquired the name (p. 377). The 
existence of only producers is not likely to last long; as speakers interact the name will 
surely be passed on to others.
Some speakers will acquire a name, but will not have any acquaintance with the 
individual. As producers in the ‘Eve’ name-using practice interact with other speakers 
the name is passed on to those that have not become acquainted with Eve. Though they 
have not been directly acquainted with Eve, these speakers can use the name and refer 
to Eve with ‘Eve’. This second group of name-users are the consumers (p. 377). The 
producers in a name-using practice may introduce new speakers into the name-using 
practice, but this might not be a formal introduction where a formal introduction would 
introduce the speaker to Eve directly. Also, speakers might observe other speakers 
using a name, which can introduce them into the practice. The consumers in the ‘Eve’ 
name-using practice are introduced into the practice, but are not acquainted with Eve in 
any way other than through the information that was passed through the practice. Any 
knowledge of Eve that the consumers have will likely be in the form of a description, 
because the knowledge will be passed through conversations with other name-users. By 
speaking to other name-users in the practice, consumers can acquire information 
regarding Eve. Consumers can be introduced into the practice by producers or 
consumers (p. 378). Acquiring a name and becoming a member of a name-using 
practice requires an introduction of some form. For consumers, that introduction does 
not require the speaker to identify Eve in person, but can be some other form of 
introduction. Such an introduction allows the new member to be able to use the name in
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line with the practice. As a consumer, this means that a producer or consumer can do 
the introduction, just so long as the inductee has an opportunity to observe the way the 
name is used allowing her to use the name in accordance with the relevant practice.
The consumers within a practice are in essence information gatherers. Lacking 
acquaintance with Eve, the consumers in the practice typically rely on others in the 
name-using practice to provide information regarding Eve. Generally, consumers 
within the practice are dependent on the producers, but there will be cases where 
consumers will add new information to the practice. Scientific, medical, and other 
advances allow consumers to introduce new information into the name-using practice. 
Given certain information about a historical figure, it can be inferred that he was a 
manic depressive, information which until recently could not be diagnosed. Most 
consumers will not add any new information into the practice, unless the consumer can 
make an inference based on information gathered from other name-users. The 
information that a given consumer has will typically have come from other name-users. 
The consumers rely on interactions with the producers where they can gather 
information. This information can then be passed through the practice, where 
consumers gather information from producers and other consumers.
By taking part in a name-using practice, whether it is at the producer or 
consumer level, and continuing to use the name, speakers sustain the practice. The 
practice depends on the speakers’ use of the name. If all members of the practice 
stopped using a name or changed the name each time they wish to refer, the practice 
would stop. The name used within a name-using practice is subject to custom; the 
history of that custom for the practice defines that practice. The custom of using names 
to refer within the practice works to sustain the name-using practice. Within a name- 
using practice, Evans points out that there are two things that the community does that
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sustain the practice. First, generally, people learn and remember names of those in 
whom they have a genuine interest. Second, speakers use a name when they wish to 
refer to an individual where the name is known. By following the customs of name- 
using practices, as opposed to flouting them, speakers sustain that practice (p. 378-379).
So far, name-using practices have shown how networks of name-users develop 
and spread. The example of ‘Eve’ showed how speakers can be acquainted with Eve or 
far removed from any contact with her, yet both types of name-users relate ‘Eve’ to Eve 
because they are part of the same name-using practice. Name-using practices explain 
how information regarding someone such as Eve, can spread throughout the community 
of speakers that use the name ‘Eve’. Such explanations are only part of what name- 
using practices can explain. Evans’s development of name-using practices built on the 
foundational ideas that Kripke presented. Kripke maintained the requirement that 
speakers must intend to use the name in the same way as the person from whom they 
learned the name in order to refer.
Evans gives a similar but altered requirement. In a perfect language, there 
would be one name-using practice for each individual and that language would lack 
ambiguity. When name-using practices are applied to natural languages, or seen as 
developing from natural languages, there is not always a one-to-one correlation between 
individuals and name-using practices. Evans points out that there may be one practice 
for two individuals or two practices for one individual (p. 381).10 Any instance where 
two individuals are confused and given the same name, or nickname, is a situation 
where there is one practice and two individuals. When there is more than one name- 
using practice for an individual, or object, something must have caused different 
networks of name-users, which all relate to the same referent. There are two name-
10Evans points out these two scenarios; it is in no way limited to these two. There could be any number of 
name-using practices for any one object, and depending on community confusion, there may be any 
number of individuals relating to one practice.
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using practices for one individual whenever there are two distinct networks of 
communication for the name (or names) within the community (p. 381). In these 
networks, any information can travel, but the information will not pass between 
networks. Though both practices may relate to the same individual, it is not necessary 
that the networks have the same information. The networks might have the same 
information, or different information. The information in each practice will depend on 
the information that the producers pass into the practice. Two distinct practices can 
originate in different ways. An individual may have two names, wherein those that use 
each name never meet, and the named individual never discusses her two names. Two 
different practices can both use the same name for an individual, but still be different 
practices. Two groups of speakers may both use ‘Eve’ to refer to Eve, but have two 
entirely different networks. Both relate the same name to the same individual, but the 
chain of communication, though linking back to the same individual, in no way 
connects the speakers in the two practices except at the referent. The realisation that 
there can be different practices with the same name, both referring to the same person, 
or to different people, creates some tension and requires the speaker to know more than 
a name when the speakers from the two practices meet.
The existence of different name-using practices involving the same speaker and 
the same name means that speakers must have an active role in using names. When a 
speaker uses a name, that name connects the utterance to an individual through the 
name-using practice. Strawson required that when a description passes the burden of 
reference to another speaker, the other speaker be known. Kripke required that the 
speaker intend to use the name as it was learned in order to refer, but Evans makes a 
different claim. Like Kripke, Evans does not require the name-user to know where the 
name was learned, but the speaker must know which practice she is taking part in.
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Because different name-using practices exist even for the same speaker and the same 
name, Evans claimed that it is necessary that a speaker be able to manifest in which 
name-using practice she is participating in order to refer to an individual by a name (p. 
384). There is no need to be able to identify the object, since this may be an impossible 
task for a consumer, but by knowing which practice she is participating in, she can refer. 
The information that is associated with the name-using practice will often assist the 
speaker in manifesting the practice she is using (p. 384).
Manifesting which practice a speaker is participating in shows that the speaker is 
aware of the name-using practice she is using and in turn can intend to refer, as others 
do, to a particular individual. In some cases, the referent may already be made 
manifest, perhaps due to context or the presence of that individual. The ability to 
manifest the practice is still germane to being able to refer, but salient information in 
context, or tacit information shared between two speakers that use ‘Kris’ when taking 
part in the same practice, allow speakers to avoid giving a full description of which 
practice they are participating in. Other contexts will not be as clear, and someone 
might say, ‘Kris who?’-looking for clarification as to which practice is being used by 
getting information about the referent. Such manifestation is necessary to determining 
the referent, but the context of utterance will determine if it can be left tacit or must be 
explicitly stated.
The information that a speaker uses to manifest the practice she is participating 
in does not need to be factual information, but must be information that exists within the 
practice. Within a name-using practice there can be misinformation and rumours. This 
information may enter the name-using practice viciously or accidentally. Once the 
information enters the practice it becomes part of the practice just like factual 
information. This will often happen to consumers because they have no way of
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verifying information except by other consumers. Producers have the advantage of 
verifying information against the named individual. Misinformation within the practice 
does not destroy one’s ability to refer. Name-using practices are not like descriptions. 
They connect to the referent by a chain of communication, not by the satisfaction of the 
information associated with a practice. For Evans, the ability of the producers to 
continue identifying the referent allows the consumers to have misinformation, but not 
have their link undermined (p. 385).
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4. Post Kripke: What is Direct Reference?
What Kripke Did
In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke changed the course of analytic 
philosophy, by challenging many of the accepted views. One of which was the 
descriptive analysis of names. No longer were descriptions considered part of the 
semantic account of names. But, Kripke only challenged the descriptivists. He never 
posited a new theory, although, it was inevitable that one would develop. That theory 
has been called ‘Direct Reference’.
The Remaining Theory: What is Direct Reference?
Bertrand Russell held a view that without his epistemic restrictions is basically 
direct reference. Russell viewed logically proper names as different from descriptions. 
Definite descriptions have as their meaning concepts and universals, whereas logically 
proper names designate an individual and that individual is the meaning of the term 
(1919, p. 51). Russell’s later theory put epistemic restrictions on what counts as a 
name. This resulted in Russell claiming that non-logically proper names are 
synonymous with definite descriptions, which was shown problematic in the previous 
discussion of Kripke. But names as directly referential terms can still be seen even 
when Russell restricts these names to the class of logically proper names. When a 
speaker uses a logically proper name in a sentence, the individual, or object, referred to 
by the name is a part of the proposition. This is essentially direct reference, but Russell 
restricted propositional content to those things that one can be directly acquainted with.
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Thus, Russell was forced to accept that logically proper names are the only names that
are directly referential.11
David Kaplan was one of the first to give a significant analysis and explanation
of direct reference. In “Demonstratives”, Kaplan set out how indexicals refer (1989b).
Through that work, he also gave the basics of the semantics for direct reference.
According to Kaplan, ‘direct reference’ is:
.. .theories of meaning according to which certain singular terms refer 
directly without the mediation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning, (p. 483)
Within such a theory, the singular terms that are directly referential are such that:
[t]he proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would 
involve individuals directly rather than by way of the “individual 
concepts” or “manners of presentation” (p. 483)
The proposition expressed by a sentence of the form ‘Fn’ containing a directly
referential singular term, ‘n’, is a singular proposition. These propositions, as stated
above, involve the referent instead of a concept or mode of presentation. According to
Frege and Russell, the semantic content, or proposition, expressed by a sentence such
that it contains ‘n’ and ‘n’ is an ordinary proper name does not have an individuals as a
constituent, but instead a concept, mode of presentation, or description as the content of
1 9a name. Alternatively, according to direct reference, a singular proposition for an 
atomic sentence involves the referent of the singular term and the property predicated 
on the individual in the sentence. An ordered pair represents these singular 
propositions. Consider the following sentence:
Jones is bald.
The proposition expressed by this sentence can be represented by the ordered pair: 
<Jones, bald>.
11 Though different names exist for this theory, ‘Direct reference’ will be used throughout to avoid 
confusion.
12 Though Russell would agree that for logically proper names the referent is the semantic content, but for 
ordinary proper names Russell was committed to the content being a definite description.
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Just as the proposition involves the referent and property so does the ordered pair.
Understanding what the direct reference theorist is trying to convey can be done
by looking at logic. Kaplan says that the paradigm for a directly referential term is the
variable (p. 484). A variable within a schema is assigned an object as its value, and in
turn that value is its meaning.
In determining a semantical value for a formula containing a free 
variable we may be given a value for the variable- that is, an individual 
drawn from the universe over which the variable is taken to range-but 
nothing more. (p. 484)
A sentence, or schema, in logic with an object assigned to a variable has that object as
the meaning of the variable. Just as an object is assigned to a variable in logic,
something similar happens with directly referential terms. A directly referential term
has as its semantic content an object; the object that is assigned to the term by linguistic
rules, deictic use, or ostensive reference fixing is the semantic content of the term.
The claim that directly referential terms refer without the mediation of a Fregean
sense has caused some confusion within direct reference. There are two ways that this
could be taken. Directly referential terms can refer unmediated simpliciter, or they can
refer unmediated by any propositional content. Kaplan was in favour of the latter and
claimed that the first was implausible and contrary to linguistic and contextual rules that
exist for directly referential terms like indexicals and demonstratives (p. 568-9). That
still does not make it clear what Kaplan means. He explains:
the relation between the linguistic expression and the referent is not 
mediated by the corresponding propositional component, the content of 
what is said. (p. 568)
To fully understand this, it is important to again look at the Fregean picture. For Frege 
there were three parts to a name: the term, the sense, and the reference. When a speaker 
uses a name in a sentence the sense is what is expressed and is the propositional 
content; that sense then determines the name’s contribution to the truth-condition, i.e.
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the object satisfying the sense. Direct reference separates any conceptual content from 
the proposition. A directly referential term refers to an object and that object is part of 
the proposition. The truth-condition for the sentence is determined by the singular 
proposition; in fact, the truth-condition is the proposition because the instantiation, or 
uninstantiation, of the ordered «-tuple will be true and false respectively. On the 
Fregean conception, the truth-condition is determined by the proposition, which was 
conceptual.
Direct reference is not claiming that a term is completely devoid of descriptive
meaning. It is claiming that any descriptive or linguistic meaning a term may have is
not part of the proposition and plays no direct part in determining the truth-condition.
Reference must be determined in some way; it may be considered descriptional though
not always in the traditional sense. Francois Recanati gives a clear statement of the
thesis of direct reference:
A (directly) referential term is a term that serves simply to refer. It is 
devoid of descriptive content, in the sense at least that what it contributes 
to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is not a 
concept, but an object. Such a sentence is used to assert o f  the object 
referred to that it falls under the concept expressed by the predicate 
expression of the sentence. Proper names and indexicals are supposed to 
be referential in this sense. (1993 p. 3)
Direct reference, and any variant of it, is just that any directly referential term has as its
semantic content its reference, not even in part any descriptive content, but simply the
referent.
Kaplan's Distinction between Semantic and Linguistic Meaning
David Kaplan not only presented the framework of the theory of direct 
reference, but by using indexicals and demonstratives went on to show that there are 
two types of meaning to an expression. By distinguishing two types of meaning,
39
Kaplan was able to explain how the reference is determined within a context for 
indexicals, while maintaining that sentences containing directly referential singular 
terms express singular propositions. According to Kaplan, all singular terms have 
content and character. This distinction is the difference between the semantic content 
and linguistic meaning of a singular term.
When a speaker makes an utterance, there is something that is expressed within 
the speaker’s context. That which the speaker expresses is what Kaplan called 
‘content’. The content of an expression is what has been termed the ‘proposition’ and is 
the ‘what is expressed’ by the expression (1989b, p. 500). It is what is evaluated within 
a circumstance of evaluation, possible world, or counterfactual situation. If the content 
is a proposition, as it would be for complete declarative sentences, when it is evaluated 
at a circumstance its evaluation will be a truth-value. It is the proposition, which is the 
content of an expression that is evaluated; the truth of a sentence then depends on the 
proposition. As was said above, the proposition is the truth-condition, since the same 
proposition may have different truth-values in different circumstances of evaluation, 
possible worlds, or counterfactual situations depending on whether or not the ordered n- 
tuple is instantiated. Not only do entire sentences have content, but parts of sentences 
have content as well. For a directly referring singular term the content is an object. For 
non-directly referring expression, such as definite descriptions including rigid 
descriptions, the content will be a complex that has concepts and properties as its parts.
Along with content, expressions and terms have character. The character of an 
expression is its linguistic meaning. The character of an expression is set by linguistic 
convention and is used to determine the content of an utterance within a context of 
utterance (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 505). In this way, character is meaning in the sense that it
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is what a competent language user knows. The character of an expression can be said to 
be descriptive, though ‘descriptive’ may not be the best term, since it differs from the 
traditional ideas of descriptivism. The character of a term determines the reference 
within a context. It incorporates linguistic rules and practices, which along with a 
context of utterance determine content. When a speaker utters a sentence in context, the 
character o f the utterance (composed of the characters of the parts) determines the 
proposition. For an atomic sentence containing a directly referring term and a monadic 
predicate, the character will determine, depending on context, a singular proposition 
involving the referent and property both determined by the character of the expressions.
The character of an expression is the linguistic rule set by the conventions of a 
linguistic community. In order to see these rules, indexicals can be considered as giving 
a vivid picture of how these rules within a context determine content. When two 
speakers use ‘I’, there is a sense in which they say the same thing and a sense in which 
they say something very different. Two speakers can both utter ‘I am bored’ at time t 
such that the first says something true and the second something false. Both speakers 
uttered the same sentence, but the content of both utterances differed. Sensitivity to 
context makes indexicals perfect for showing the distinction between character and 
content.
When two speakers utter the same sentence containing an indexical, they utter 
the same linguistic sentence, but may express different contents. ‘I’ has its content, i.e. 
reference, within context of utterance, but also its character. The character of an 
indexical like ‘I’ takes the expression from context to content. Consider again the 
utterance ‘I am bored’. When a speaker utters the sentence, the context along with the 
rules for ‘I’ determine the referent. In the case of ‘I’, the rule says that it is the speaker 
within the context that is the content of ‘I’. The proposition expressed is then a singular
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proposition involving x, the speaker, and the property of being bored. In the same way, 
demonstratives, such as ‘this’, have their referents as their content determined by their 
character in a context. The character for ‘this’ is a rule similar to saying something like 
‘the object demonstrated within the context of utterance.’ The rules determining 
content when an indexical is used will usually determine different content in different 
contexts. Because the character will determine different content for ‘I’ depending on 
the speaker, every speaker will express different content involving his or herself.
Confusion over character can easily result in moving one from direct reference 
back into a descriptive theory. One could easily confuse character with content, in that 
the character of an expression, especially indexicals because of the descriptive-like 
rules, is considered part of the content, or proposition expressed. Consider again the 
sentence ‘I am bored’. One could easily see why someone would want to combine the 
linguistic rules for ‘I’ into the proposition. Most speakers do not refer to themselves in 
the third person; they say ‘I’ to distinguish themselves from others when they speak. 
When a speaker utters ‘I am bored’ it seems as though part of what they are saying is 
that they are the speaker, and so it may seem that the proposition is that the speaker is 
bored.
Placing character in the content is wrong. Character plays no part in the 
propositional content of an expression. The rules and mechanisms of a language are not 
a component of the proposition (Kaplan, 1989 p. 569). This is not the complete denial 
of modes of presentation, just that such modes of presentation are not part of the 
proposition. When a speaker uses a demonstrative there must be a demonstration, and 
part of that demonstration is a mode of presentation. Pointing at a cat and saying ‘That 
is ugly’ does not say anything about the demonstration. There is no way the 
demonstration can be expressed, but what can is a singular proposition involving the cat
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determined by the demonstration in the context and the property of being ugly. The 
mode of presentation plays no part in the content; directly referential terms are, as 
Kaplan says, ‘transparent’ (p. 572). What connects the linguistic expression to its 
content is unseen in the content. Speakers use certain words in a context in order that 
the listeners can grasp a particular piece of information. The same piece of information 
can be expressed using any number of sentences.
Benefits of the theory
Despite complexities that arise from the distinction between character and 
content, direct reference provides a natural and beneficial theory. When a speaker 
utters the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’, the subject of the sentence is Socrates, and a 
natural interpretation is that the expression says something directly about Socrates. 
Direct reference also gives an account of assertions that is natural. Speakers assert 
something regarding Socrates the individual, not some mode of presentation of 
Socrates. A Fregean theory claims that the subject matter is still Socrates, but what is 
expressed is the mode of presentation. In ordinary contexts of utterance, the speaker 
wants to say something about Socrates; she asserts that Socrates is wise. In doing so, 
the speaker expresses a singular proposition. The information the speaker is trying to 
express is about the individual, who is the referent of the name, and it is that he has the 
property predicated on him. For all non-propositional attitude contexts, this seems to be 
the correct and natural explanation of utterances and assertions regarding names and 
indexicals.
When speakers utter different sentences using different indexical, 
demonstratives, or names all regarding the same person, direct reference again gives a 
natural explanation. Declarative sentences containing names, indexicals, and
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demonstratives all express singular propositions; when the referent is the same, the 
same singular proposition is expressed. Any number of speakers can express the same 
singular proposition with different sentences in different contexts. Consider the 
following four sentences, which all, on the direct reference theory, allow substitution 
salva veritate and express the same proposition.
(a) I am a philosopher (uttered by Socrates).
(b) You are a philosopher (uttered to Socrates).
(c) He is a philosopher (pointing at Socrates).
(d) Socrates is a philosopher.
In each of the above sentences, the same proposition is expressed. The first three 
require the context to determine the content of the indexicals, but in all three, the 
property of being a philosopher is attributed to Socrates. The same is true in (d). Given 
that speakers use sentences in this way, direct reference again gives a natural account of 
content.
In addition to giving a natural account of sentence content and substitution, 
direct reference gives a straightforward solution to Kripke’s arguments previously 
raised in chapter 2. When a speaker uses a directly referential term with a non-identity 
predicate, the speaker does not express something a priori. For some <j>, if a speaker 
utters ‘Mary is <J>’ there is no reason to believe that the utterance is a priori. If ‘Mary’ 
had descriptive content and ‘(|>’ was the concept of the description for ‘Mary’, then 
‘Mary is <(>’ should be knowable a priori. Such a sentence is not knowable a priori, and 
direct reference reflects this. It also gives an account of counterfactuals consistent with 
the way speakers use names and indexicals. An utterance of ‘He is eating an apple’ 
understood through a descriptive theory will be such that the sentence does not express 
a singular proposition, but a proposition where the content of ‘he’ will be descriptive. 
This will result in ‘he’ having different truth-makers in different circumstances of 
evaluation when derived from the same context of utterance. When speakers speak
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counterfactually they talk about an individual in another circumstance, not someone 
who is qualitatively similar in another circumstance. The proposition expressed is 
singular not general. This is reflected in direct reference.
Furthermore, since direct reference is the result of Kripke’s arguments, it has the 
benefit of not being affected by the modal argument. Because the content of a name is 
its referent, and the content of the name is what is evaluated in counterfactually, the 
same object will be considered in counterfactual situations. As directly referential 
terms, names act just as Kripke said that they should when considered counterfactually.
Though Kaplan’s main focus is on indexicals and demonstratives, he does make 
mention of, and expound on, proper names, which is the primary focus here. Proper 
names, under the theory of direct reference, are, like indexicals, directly referential. 
Kaplan did not see proper names as presenting as clear a picture as indexicals in his 
statement of direct reference. Because indexicals and demonstratives can designate 
different objects, or individuals, within different contexts they illustrate the distinction 
between character and content better than proper names. It is because names differ 
from indexicals that they need to be considered apart from indexicals.
Indexicals have as their character linguistic rules determining different content 
in different contexts of utterance. This however, is not the case for proper names. 
Proper names seem to determine the same object in every context of utterance. In this 
way, names differ from indexicals and demonstratives. Kaplan claims that names have 
fixed content and fixed character; they pick out the same object in every context and 
circumstance of evaluation. Regardless of who uses a name, or when that name is used, 
it will always have the same content. It is because names have fixed content and 
character that Kaplan thought that the character and content distinction collapsed for 
proper names. For Kaplan, referent, content, and character all collapse into one for
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proper names. It is the same object determined in every context, so it is the referent of a 
name that determines its content in a context. Because of this it is not aberrant to see 
proper names as having no meaning other than reference (1989b, p. 562). Kaplan does 
not explain how this will affect competent speakers’ understanding of linguistic 
meaning of names.13
By claiming that the referent is the only meaning for names, one is then 
committed to claiming that any linguistically competent speaker that uses a name knows 
the referent, since that is what it has as its linguistic meaning. However, this is not 
observed in ordinary language users that are not properly acquainted with the referent, 
but still use a name after only hearing it once. Furthermore, now the character of a 
name will simply be the identity function, i.e.^(x)=(jc). The character of a proper name 
would be the function from an object to itself, e.g. from Kaplan to Kaplan. For the 
purpose of character, such a function in uninformative and not what a competent 
speaker understands.
Competent speakers can use a name to refer to its referent without knowing the 
referent. For Kaplan, denying that character is reference leads one to claim that names 
do not have a linguistic meaning. In this case, the outcome is undesirable. It is clear 
from the way we use names that a speaker can properly use a name without knowing the 
referent; a speaker can even use indexicals in some cases without any knowledge of the 
referent.
This can be seen with ‘you’. Suppose someone overhears one side of a phone 
conversation not knowing who is on the other end. What is overheard is “I will meet
13 Kaplan did seem to have some hesitation with this claim. In “Demonstratives” (1989), after claiming 
that reference seemed to be the most obvious candidate for character, Kaplan says that if the character of 
a proper name is its reference then all co-referring proper names will have the same character and this 
implies that the competent speaker should know this, but does not (p. 562-563). He then mentions other 
possibilities, but does not defend them or give reasons for their place as character. One example Kaplan 
gives is causal chains, which are discussed below.
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you at the comer of 11 and Race at 9 P.M.” Now, there is no way that it can be known 
by overhearing this sentence who the referent of ‘you’ is in this context, but the 
sentence can be understood by any competent English speaker. Speakers of English 
know that ‘you’ is context sensitive and as a rule, i.e. its character, determines its 
referent when a speaker uses it to address her addressee(s). Since there is a rule that 
linguistically competent speakers understand for indexicals the same should be true for 
proper names, but if the character of a name is its reference this is not so. In the next 
chapter, I will expound on this problem and try to include a possible solution while 
relying on the way in which names refer, as seen in chapter 3.
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5. Names, their linguistic meaning, and how they refer
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the theory left after Kripke’s 
arguments are considered. The remaining theory is what has been called ‘direct 
reference’. According to direct reference, sentences containing directly referential 
terms, i.e. names, indexicals, and demonstratives, express singular propositions. The 
terms within the sentence each have character and content, which are the components of 
the character and content of the entire sentence. For indexicals and demonstratives, it is 
clear what character is, but for names character is not as clear
Determining the character of a proper name can be done by considering what the 
character of the term does, and by seeing what fits that criterion for names. Based on 
Kaplan’s explanation of character for indexicals as a function leading to content and as 
the meaning that a competent speaker understands a criterion can be given for the 
character of proper names. Proper names do not refer by description, but instead 
through name-using practices. Though this is how names typically refer, it is neither a 
function nor what a competent speaker understands. But regardless of how names refer, 
the character of a proper name must be such that the competent speaker, at a minimum, 
can grasp the meaning as character of a term. How names refer and what is required to 
understand the terms will guide the search for the character of proper names.
Character of Proper Names
The function of character is to determine the referent in a context, or in all 
contexts for a name. Name-using practices showed that speakers that are members in a 
name-using practice can use a name to refer by intending to use the name in accordance 
with the name-using practice. Speakers that are not members in a practice refer in the
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way Kripke explained. A speaker hears a name and intends to use it to refer in the same 
way as the speaker from whom it was learned. These name-users, i.e. the non-members, 
present a problem if it were claimed that name-using practices are the character of 
proper names. Character is also what competent language users know. Non-members 
in a name-using practice can still refer to an individual by using a name, but have no 
knowledge of the name-using practice. Name-using practices, alone, cannot account for 
the character of a proper name.
Kaplan’s account of character for demonstratives was that it is a function from 
context to content. Though Kaplan felt that names differ from demonstratives in 
character, considering the role of character for demonstratives can illuminate what the 
character of a proper name should be. For indexicals and demonstratives, the rule that 
speakers understand and apply to the context gives the content. A competent speaker 
does not have to know the content of an indexical in order to understand another 
speaker’s utterance containing an indexical (see above, chapter 4, p. 46).
The character of a name cannot be limited to name-using practices and will be 
whatever it is that a linguistically competent speaker understands when she understands 
the name and can use it to refer. Observations of competent speakers give a picture of 
what speakers can do when they understand a name, even at the most basic level. 
Speakers can refer when the name has only been heard once, although speakers do not 
know the referent when the name is first heard. Character cannot just be a name-using 
practice or chain of communication because to hear a name in a sentence does not 
introduce someone into a name-using practice. Just as in the ‘you’ case (CH. 4), a 
language user can overhear a sentence where a name is used and understand the 
utterance without knowing the referent of the name. A speaker may say, “Remind me 
to call Brian.” If the addressee does not know the referent of ‘Brian’, she will still
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understand the utterance, and will still refer to Brian when she says, “Remember, you 
need to call Brian.” Speakers that are unaware of reference, and the particular name- 
using practices involved, can still understand sentences containing the name. Since 
speakers can hear any name in a sentence, understand that sentence, and use the name to 
refer, some aspect of the character of a proper name must be common to all names.
When a speaker utters a sentence containing a name, there must be something in 
the meaning of the name that is common to all speakers, other than reference, that 
allows all competent speakers to understand the utterance without knowing the referent. 
When someone hears a sentence containing a name there is a fundamental aspect that 
must be grasped which is that the term is a name. When someone hears the words 
‘Remind me to call Brian’, she does not understand the sentence if she does not know 
that ‘Brian’ is a name. Understanding a name within a sentence is at least to understand 
that it is a name. The listener may not know what the name names, i.e. whether it is a 
person, city, country, pet, or any object having a name, but must understand that it is a 
name. In order to understand that a term is a name, one must understand how names 
function in sentences containing them.
When a language user understands a term as a name, she grasps certain features 
that all names have in common. Pre-theoretically we can ask what a speaker using a 
name must know in order to be considered competent. Anyone that understands a 
name, by way of using it or understanding a sentence containing it, understands how 
and why names are used. I will call this ‘name*’. By grasping a name, someone 
understands:
Name*- that names are referential devices with a convention attached 
that determines a particular referent. That is, a name V  has a referent, 
and there is an x and a convention by which the term V  refers to x  and x 
has the name, V ,  used in the utterance.
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Name* is a rule that speakers follow. This information must be at least part of the 
character of a proper name. This is the minimum requirement that a speaker 
understands when she understands a name. When a speaker hears a term for the first 
time, and learns that it is a name, she does not know its value, but she can understand 
how that term should be used in a sentence, though she may never use it to utter a true 
sentence, or judge the truth-value of another’s utterance. With name* in mind, we can 
ask what someone using a name without being a member of the practice does not know. 
The fringe name-users do not know what the referent is. How is one familiar with the 
referent? Through the name-using practice. So, for speakers that are not members of a 
name-using practice, but can still use a name to refer, there must be a name-using 
practice to give a referent as the value of the function. This, with name*, will all be 
considered in giving the character and argument for the character of a name.
The requirements espoused in regard to name* differ very little from that which 
is presented by Francois Recanati (1993). He starts with similar intuitions, which 
overlap the present view regarding name*. He claims that someone can use a name, and 
refer, when that person has never heard the name before. Based on this, what is 
required of a name-user will be minimal. It is similar to name*, since he claims that 
part of the linguistic meaning of a name is that it is a referential expression and that the 
name names its bearer, but the addition of an assumption gives Recanati’s view a 
different nature. Recanati claims that names are like indexicals. Just as indexicals 
require context to determine content, so do names. Proper names, according to 
Recanati, have two conventions associated with them. There is a linguistic convention, 
which all names have in common, and a social convention, determined by context that 
determines the referent. I agree with Recanati that there is a common linguistic 
convention, but disagree on what that convention is. For Recanati, the linguistic
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convention of a name goes from the name and context to the social convention; this 
linguistic convention is the character of a proper name and is a function,/(c)=social 
convention, from context to social convention. The social convention, determined by 
the name and context, determines the link between the name and the referent. Nothing 
is said as to what the social convention is other than that it links the name to the 
referent. This leaves Recanati open to questions as to what type of convention this 
social convention is.
By relating names to indexicals in the way that he does, Recanati differs from
what is supported here. We are in agreement that the character of all names will be the
same, but differ on what the character is. Underlying Recanati’s desire to make names
like indexicals is an explicit assumption. He says:
[t]he conventions assigning bearers to proper names are not linguistic 
conventions. They are part of the context rather than part of the 
language. (1993, p. 138).
His claim is that it is reasonable to think that the social convention is not part of the
linguistic convention because someone can understand the name without knowing the
bearer. This distinction is based on linguistic competence and what a minimally
competent speaker might understand. Recanati takes the same information and
develops a theory that differs from what is espoused below.
In more detail, the view that Recanati puts forward is this. Names convey more 
than that they are referential expressions; meaning that they must have some sort of 
mode of presentation, i.e. character. Such a mode of presentation is that the referent of 
‘N ’ is presented as the bearer of ‘N’ by the linguistic convention in which proper names 
refer to their bearers (p. 139). This linguistic convention is the same for all proper 
names and coupled with the context determines the particular social convention which 
in turn determines the particular referent of each ‘N’. The bearer of the name is
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determined by a contextual, non-linguistic, matter, i.e. social convention, and for this 
reason Recanati claims that the reference of proper names depends on context like 
indexicals (p. 140). So Recanati’s view is as follows:
1. Speakers that successfully use/understand a name know the character 
of that name.
2. Character is the same for all names, and is a function from context to 
social convention.
3. The various social conventions determine the referents.
For Recanati names with the same spelling are not homonyms,14 but are more like
indexicals since character is the same for all names.
Accepting that name* is what all competent speakers need to understand leads to 
a view similar to Recanati’s, but it will differ. The character of a name should 
determine the content of the name, but for Recanati, the function determines a social 
convention. There is nothing preventing the conclusion that a social convention, 
whatever it is, is the content of a name. This is a problem for Recanati, for if character 
is a function with the referent of the term as its value, the users of eN’ refer to a social 
convention, not to N. Recanati is deviating from what character was intended to be and 
making it more complex than it should be. In order to maintain direct reference, 
Recanati must insert another loop to get the result that a proposition <N,.. .> is 
expressed, not a proposition <Social convention,.. .>.
Even with this problem in mind, there is still something about this view that is 
appealing given the similarities in linguistic observations, i.e. name*. It seems as 
though there is something viable in claiming that the character of all names is the same, 
even though it departs from an initial inclination that names are homonyms. Just as 
linguistically competent speakers can use and understand indexicals without knowing 
the referent, so the same is true of names. As long as a speaker knows how to use a
14 For Recanati, if  names were homonyms then speakers would need to know the reference in order to 
have a linguistically competent understanding of a name. For Recanati this could only happen if names 
were part o f idiolects, a result he does not want to embrace. See Recanati (1993, p. 143-152).
53
name in general, she can be credited with understanding it. If names were homonyms, 
speakers would be required to understand the convention by which each name refers in 
order to understand that name. In this way names would then have a strongly local 
character (Recanati 1993, p. 146-148). Most names do not enter the usage of all 
members of the linguistic community. Names are local in that they are used primarily 
by only those that are acquainted with the referent, directly or indirectly. But due to this 
localness of names, speakers in general do not need to know anything about the referent 
of a name in order to use the name.
There is still a further problem for Recanati resulting from his claim that names 
are indexicals. Indexicals are such that once a speaker learns the rule for the indexical, 
she can use that indexical in any context and tend to make at least some true 
assertions.15 Linguistically competent speakers can understand utterances made by 
other speakers using indexicals even when it is not clear who the referent is. In the 
situation where someone overhears someone on the phone, there is at least a uniquely 
identifying description that can be inferred from hearing someone saying ‘you’ while on 
the phone, i.e. the x such that x  is on the phone speaking to him [where ‘him’ refers 
demonstratively to the visible person heard speaking on the phone].
Unlike indexicals, speakers using names do not have all the same privileges
once the rules of proper names, in general, are learned. Competent speakers entering
new contexts can confidently use indexicals to refer to the same individual as the other
speakers in the context, but names do not always allow this, i.e. the speaker could
mistake the current name-using practice for another and refer to a different person.
There must be something disparate between indexicals and proper names in what is
known by someone using each. Suppose Jakob is a member of a name-using practice
151 am here excluding trivial utterances such as ‘you are human or you are not human’ where ‘you’ refers 
to the same individual with both uses in the sentence. Anyone accepting bivalence would agree with a 
sentence of the form ‘x is $  or x is not- $
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for ‘John Smith’. Jakob and John are close friends, so there is no doubt that Jakob is a 
competent user of ‘John Smith’. It can be assumed that if Jakob hears a sentence with a 
name, any name, in the sentence, he will understand it just so long as he knows the 
name is a name, because there is a basic understanding, i.e. name*, that all speakers 
have that know how to use names allowing them to use names that they have only heard 
once. When Jakob enters a new name-using practice, or thinks he enters a new name- 
using practice, he will have a basic understanding of the utterances due to his 
understanding of proper names.
The indexical view presented by Recanati fails when speakers unknowingly 
enter new name-using practices. When a speaker unknowing enters a new name-using 
practice, it is questionable what he says and how far he understands utterances. Rules 
for indexicals allow speakers to enter new contexts and avoid ambiguity. When Jakob 
enters a new ‘John Smith’ name-using practice, not knowing that it is a new practice, 
there will be confusion though it may not be apparent to the participants. Assume Jakob 
enters a pub and begins talking with a group of individuals who are talking about 
someone named ‘John Smith’. Jakob assumes this is his close friend, but is mistaken; 
actually, it is someone else named ‘John Smith’ that Jakob has never come into contact 
with, and about whom he has no information or link. Jakob, not knowing that he was 
taking part in a different name-using practice, might make assertions that are true 
regarding his friend, John Smith, but false regarding the John Smith that the others are 
referring to by ‘John Smith’. If proper names were like indexicals, there would be no 
confusion, but then the referent would be determined not by Jakob’s intention. Again, if 
names were like indexicals, by knowing name*, Jakob would have known a rule that 
would allow him to competently use ‘John Smith’ in this, and every other, context, 
because character is simply a function from context to social convention. Jakob is
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referring to a different person by ‘John Smith’ than the others are. If names were like 
indexicals and their character is a function from context to name-using practice, Jakob 
would have referred to the same person as everyone else due to the present context, but 
he still refers to his friend.
Jakob’s intention to refer to his friend John Smith, along with his ability to 
manifest the practice he is participating in keeps him from referring to the other John 
Smith, although the others might not realise that he is referring to another person. He is 
still following the same rule for ‘John Smith’, but Jakob applied a different argument to 
the function. Recanati must conclude that somehow Jakob applied the wrong context.
It is generally assumed that the context is apparent to those present, but if character is a 
function from context to social convention, Jakob did not know the context. For 
Recanati to maintain his position, he must claim that contexts are not transparent and 
can be misrecognised, since Jakob applied the wrong argument and overrode the 
function determining the social convention and in turn determined the referent on his 
own.
The linguistically competent speaker will at least understand how names work in 
sentences, but not every situation where the name applies. There are different degrees 
of linguistic understanding for names. All linguistically competent speakers will have a 
basic understanding of a name, i.e. name*, by knowing that it is a name. Recanati 
claimed this is all a speaker needs to understand to use any name in any context, but the 
example of Jakob showed that a speaker could unknowingly enter a new name-using 
practice and refer to someone else because he intends to use the name according to 
another name-using practice. So name-users can be unaware of the relevant current 
context. For if Jakob knew that he entered a new practice, he could have taken part in 
the new practice, but he did not know so he could not. What Jakob did is comparable to
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using ‘he’, where a group of speakers use it for a referent that is salient, while Jakob 
used it to refer to someone from another context. No competent speaker would do this 
with an indexical without it being clear that he is referring to someone outside the 
current context, because there is no mistake over the relevant linguistic rule F, and the 
relevant context c.16
To avoid Recanati’s complexities it can still be maintained that the character of 
all names is the same, but the arguments for the function will differ. There is a single 
function true of all names, which allows all speakers to use a name and refer regardless 
of whether or not they are members in the practice. All speakers knowing that a term is 
a name know how that term functions in the language. These speakers do not have to be 
part of a name-using practice to use the name, so long as the name is used with the 
intention that it refers to the same person as did the person from whom the term was 
learned. Hearing a name and using it in one conversation is not enough to initiate 
someone into a name-using practice. There is a boundary between membership in the 
overall linguistic community and membership in a particular local name-using practice. 
Part of Evans’s criterion for sustaining a practice is that speakers learn and use the name 
of those in whom they have an interest. Learning a new name in a pub conversation 
does not make that person a member of the practice, if he walks away never to use or 
consider the name again. A superficial understanding of names was used to refer, utter 
sentences, and understand sentences. Being a member of a name-using practice differs
1 7from understanding how to use a name.
16 There are likely some exceptions to this. If within the context o f utterance and demonstration there is a 
carefully placed mirror, the speaker might refer to someone outside the relevant context thinking that the 
referent is clearly visible to the audience.
17 Kripke’s account o f chains o f communication gives a clear account of using a name in conversations 
for the first time.
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A Simpler View
On Recanati’s view, the character of a name is a function from context to social 
convention. He claimed that the social convention then determines the referent. It is 
not clear exactly what the social convention is, but it must be something similar to a 
name-using practice. If this is so, then there is still more problems for Recanati’s view 
when we consider those that are only briefly exposed to the name-using practice, i.e. 
those that are not members, but still use the name to refer. Here is how this will look.
A new user of ‘Brian’ knows the function, but not the context. This seems odd, but on 
his account it must be so. If the social convention is, in fact, similar to name-using 
practices and the new user does not know which name-using practice is being invoked 
by the use of ‘Brian’, then she must be ignorant of the context. If she knew the context 
it would determine for her the name-using practice. The speaker has only heard the 
name once and is using the name, but is unaware of the name-using practice. It is not 
clear what that context would be.
Based on ideas, such as name* and some of Recanati’s ideas, a better picture can 
be given. When someone hears a name for the first time, the hearer is ignorant of the 
relevant name-using practice. The relevant name-using practice is the context in one 
sense. The character of a name is the function from name-using practices to their 
referents. The hearer grasps this character and understands the name. The advantage of 
this view of character over Kaplan’s, and Recanati’s, is that the character of ‘Brian’ is 
now not a function from any context to the same referent (pace Kaplan), but a function 
from different contexts (different name-using practices) to different referents (pace 
Recanati). This allows name* to remain as knowledge of the character, of that common 
function, and this is consistent with the idea that speakers can use and understand names 
without being members in the relevant name-using practice. In essence, all names are 
synonyms, since they all have the same function, i.e. same character.
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The function is a partial function from name-using practices to references. The 
function is partial because some name-using practices have no reference, or more than 
one reference, such as when two practices are accidentally combined. The rule is:
For any name-using practice p,/(p)=the unique object x  (if there is one)
such that producers of p gather or gathered information about x.
In addition there is a social, i.e. pragmatic, partial function from context, in the Kaplan 
sense, of utterance to name-using practice employed: g(c)=p. As a pragmatic function, 
this is based on presuppositions of those participating in a given conversation. This 
function to p can be overridden. Consider again Jakob, or the introduction of a new 
John Smith as topic of a conversation. In the Jakob case, there is a breakdown in 
pragmatics, while in the latter the speakers are dictating the relevant argument.
Taking this overall line of argument I am forced to concede that names are not 
homonyms, but rather synonyms, but my account still differs from Recanati’s indexical 
account. Again, like Recanati, I have two functions, but we differ on which function is 
the character. I claim that there are two senses of context: (1) that which is presented by 
Kaplan and is the argument in the pragmatic function, and (2) the name-using practice. 
The character of a name is the second function. For Recanati, it is the first, but there is 
also a difference in the second function generally. I am specific about the name-using 
practice and function where Recanati leaves this open. Unfortunately, seeing proper 
names as homonyms is more in line with the way we consider names, which leaves me 
with a counter-intuitive claim. Speakers intend to use a name in a particular way, and 
that name is associated with a single object through a name-using practice. Any speaker 
within a name-using practice, ignorant of any other object with the same name, would 
never use the name to refer to someone other than the source of the practice. It is tacitly 
known within a name-using practice that the members are referring to the same
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individual. Though the surface structure of names may appear the same, there must be 
something that members of a practice can do that non-members cannot.
Earlier, with Jakob and ‘John Smith’, we saw that Jakob could refer to someone 
other than the John Smith currently under discussion. What we can see is that speakers 
that are members of name-using practices do not have to rely on the social (pragmatic) 
partial function in order to determine the name-using practice. Members know which 
practices they are a part of and can apply that practice accordingly, although this may 
cause confusion. Though we may at first want to claim that names with the same 
spelling are homonyms, because they refer to different individuals, this is not so. All 
names are synonyms, but for members in a given name-using practice, their ability to 
apply that practice to the function will always determine the referent they want, which 
gives rise to the view that names are homonyms. But the character of ‘Brian’ is the 
same as ‘Kris’, and the name-using practice applied for each will be different, so a 
particular name-using practice applied to the name function will always determine the 
same referent, or in the case of empty names and confused practices, no referent and 
multiple referents accordingly.
Now we can see the character of a name working for both members and non­
members of name-using practices. When any competent speaker uses a proper name 
she has a degree of understanding that varies with her relation to the referent through 
the name-using practice. Speakers require a minimal understanding in order to use a 
name in some context. When a speaker joins a conversation where a name is being used 
for an individual unknown to the new participant, the speaker does not have to know 
anything other than name*. Knowing this demonstrates that the speaker is in command 
of the language, but not that she knows anything regarding the referent, or name-using 
practice, except that the referent bears the name used. Here, the name-using practice is
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predetermined by the context, i.e. with the pragmatic function. Through interaction in 
the conversation some information can be gleaned allowing greater interaction within 
the conversation. When the speaker leaves the context, she must satisfy Evans’s 
requirement of having an interest in the referent in order to continue using the name. To 
refer outside the first conversation the speaker must have a greater understanding than 
name*. She must have an interest in joining the practice, placing her at an early stage of 
being a consumer. Questions will be asked such as ‘I was talking to so-and-so about N. 
Who is N ?\
What speakers understand and grasp will differ between speakers that are not 
part of a name-using practice, consumers, and producers. Those outside the practice 
know name*, which allows them to refer with a name when using it properly. When a 
speaker goes from being outside a practice, i.e. never hearing the name as part of the 
practice or only superficially exposed to the name-using practice, to being a consumer 
there is a vague distinction, whereas the distinction between consumer and producer is 
clear. Consumers and producers have information that allows them to grasp the 
propositions expressed by sentences containing names of which they are members of the 
name-using practice regarding that name. All competent speakers that understand a 
name understand name*, so it can be assumed that in order to be a member of a name- 
using practice, at the consumer and producer stages, these speakers are competent. As a 
consumer, the understanding that one has allows her to gather information and use the 
name in ways that the community of name-users see fit. This means that in most 
circumstances a consumer will make assertions that the members of the name-using 
practice believe to be true. Rumours might corrupt the information in the practice, but 
the members of the practice take this to be factual and this results in false information 
being part of the practice. Consumers are in a position that allows them to make
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inferences, both deductive and inductive, regarding the referent of the name based on 
the information she gathered. Such inferences may be simple inferences such as 
Charles plays the bass guitar, Charles is a philosopher, therefore Charles plays the bass 
guitar and is a philosopher, or an advanced inductive inference might be made based on 
more complex reasoning. Since Charles loves to eat cheese steaks and pizza, and while 
he is on vacation tends not to worry about his diet, while he is visiting Philadelphia he 
will probably eat cheese steaks and pizza. Those that are not members of the name- 
using practice do not have the information that members do, so they cannot make such 
inferences. Those speakers outside a name-using practice can understand an utterance 
involving ‘Charles’, but cannot grasp the proposition expressed by that utterance.18 
Non-members are not aware of the referent of a name, but only the function, so they 
only have linguistic understanding. So they do not know which proposition they 
express using ‘Charles’. By uttering ‘Charles is bald’, they assert (Charles, bald), but 
do not know it.
Returning to Jakob, something must be said, because like Recanati, my claim
that names are synonyms is subject to the same problem as his claim that names are
indexicals. For Recanati, there was an ultimatum: either accept the Jakob story as a
counter-example, or accept that contexts are not transparent. This is a problem for
Recanati, since he claims that the Kaplan style context is the argument in the linguistic
function, but for my view, Kaplan style context is the argument in the pragmatic
function. The same problem arises, but it is a pragmatic problem. Context is not
transparent in the sense that there are cases where we get the context wrong. Typically
this does not happen. Presuppositions on behalf of the conversational participants
generally pick out the right name-using practice, but similar presuppositions can lead
18 There might be something similar here to what Alice says after hearing the Jabberwocky Poem in 
Through the Looking Glass. Alice was able to recognise what the terms were doing in the sentences, but 
unable to grasp the proposition.
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speakers astray. For this reason it is a pragmatic problem, not a linguistic problem as it 
is for Recanati.
The character of a proper name is more complex than was first thought. Kaplan 
felt that because names have the same content (i.e. its reference) in every context, its 
character is just its reference. My claim, like Recanati’s, is more radical: all names have 
the same character, even though they have different references. But Recanati sees this 
common character as a function from contexts to different social conventions. Neither 
Kaplan nor Recanati supports the practical application of names in name-using 
practices. Speakers refer through the links of a name-using practice. Accepting 
Recanati’s view entails claiming that the way speakers refer when using a name is not 
part of its character. So far as character itself is concerned, speakers using N in context 
refer to a social convention, not to N itself. Kaplan gave the counter intuitive result that 
character is just reference. Neither should be the desired result.
In general, character is important to language. It is the meaning of a term such 
that it is what a competent speaker understands. It also puts the speaker in a particular 
relation to the referent. With demonstratives and indexicals, this will often be 
perceptual, although not always visual. For demonstratives, there is a demonstration, 
and for non-demonstrative indexicals a rule that automatically determines the referent in 
context. Names place the speaker in relation to the referent by way of the name-using 
practice attached to the name. For names, there is a chain of communication relating 
speaker to referent. The use of a demonstration for a demonstrative will place the 
audience in a perceptual perspective to the referent. The acquisition of a name and 
placement within the name-using practice will place speakers in a relation to the 
referent, depending on how the term was acquired. But this might simply be a relation 
wherein the individual knows N is named ‘N ’.
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6. Problems for Direct Reference
Substitution in Belief Contexts
When a speaker is attributed a belief, and that belief is de re, it is a belief 
regarding an object. To say that Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, is to say that 
Ralph’s belief is of an object, Ortcutt, not of an aggregate of properties or concepts. 
Direct reference explains de re belief as a propositional attitude, where the propositional 
content of the entire belief attribution is a relation between an individual and a singular 
proposition. Belief, knowledge, assertion, and doubt are only a few examples of such 
attitudes. They are relations that individuals have with propositions based on a given 
attitude. The proposition of the attitude need not always be singular, but if it is not, then 
it is not de re. Direct reference claims that sentences like ‘Ortcutt is a spy’ express a 
singular proposition containing Ortcutt19 and the property of spy-hood, represented as: 
(Ortcutt, spy-hood).
When Ralph believes this proposition he believes of Ortcutt, that he is a spy. Belief of 
an object is what any theory of de re belief should explain.
The problem that arises for direct reference with regard to propositional attitudes 
is the substitution of co-referring terms. Direct reference claims that the propositional 
content of a name is its referent. No matter what name is used to refer to the object, the 
content remains the same, as long as the name is a name for that object. Direct 
reference must claim that any singular proposition believed by an individual can be 
expressed using any name for the object in the subordinate clause. ‘Tom believes that 
Cicero is an orator’ can be represented by the following ordered triple:
19 This example originates in a problem Quine presented for de re belief. He questioned the ability to 
quantify into belief contexts. Quine’s worry was in regard to names, descriptions, and quantification. It 
is roughly the same problem as that which is presented below.
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(Tom, (Cicero, being-an-orator), belief).
The proposition comprises Tom, the belief relation, and the singular proposition 
comprising Cicero and the property of being an orator. Tom believes of Cicero that he 
is an orator. At first glance, this is what is wanted for de re belief, but it is questionable 
whether the truth-value of ‘Tom believes of Cicero that he is an orator’ remains the 
same if ‘Tully’ were to replace ‘Cicero’, where the two names are co-referential. The 
intuition is that the truth-value changes, since we are assuming that Tom himself would 
never assent to ‘Tom believes of Tully that he is an orator’. The semantic framework 
for direct reference maintains that both sentences express the same proposition, so there 
is no way the truth-value can differ when ‘Tully’ replaces ‘Cicero’. This problem can 
be made clear by considering the examples given by Kripke.
Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
In his article, “A Puzzle about Belief’ (1979), Kripke presents a clear picture of 
the problem posed for direct reference due to de re belief contexts. Kripke makes his 
assumptions clear so there can be no question regarding the relation that the individuals 
have toward an object, but it is because of this that the puzzle ensues. Kripke presents 
different situations to show that the puzzle is complex and is genuinely a puzzle. There 
is an inherent problem in the attribution of belief to a singular proposition. Either there 
are contradictions, or many speakers are irrational, it seems.
In order to get to the puzzle, Kripke makes some assumptions explicit. The 
Disquotation Principle, Strengthened Disquotation, and the Principle o f Translation are 
all clearly stated as assumptions. Kripke is only interested in de re beliefs, and though
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he expresses them in the form ‘Tom believes that Fa’ these are to be understood as de 
re regarding a.20
Kripke first gives the disquotation principle as a way of justifying claims that a
speaker holds a particular belief. He gives the principle as follows:
Disquotation Principle-If a normal English Speaker, on reflection, sincerely 
assents to */?’ then he believes that p. (Kripke 1979, p. 112-113)
This principle allows us to attribute beliefs to speakers. It may be debatable whether or
not the principle is the best way to determine belief states; there is no clear way for
anyone to be sure of the mental states of any other individual. This is an assumption.
Without it, or any other similar principle, it would be impossible to make any claim that
a speaker holds a particular belief.
Kripke goes on to strengthen the conditions of the disquotation principle and
make it a bi-conditional. He gives it as:
Strengthened Disquotation-A normal English speaker who is not reticent will 
be disposed to sincere reflective assent to */?’ if and only if he believes that p .
(p. 113)
Kripke presents strengthened disquotation as a clear assumption about belief states and 
as a preventative measure. The disquotational principle alone leads to the belief that p  
and the belief that ~p, just so long as the speaker makes the assertions of */?* and 
The requirements of the strengthened disquotational principle attribute belief and non­
belief based on assent and silence respectively. As stated, these principles are limited; 
disquotation and strengthened disquotation, taken alone, only deal with English 
speakers.
In order for these principles to explain belief for non-English speakers, 
qualification is needed; Kripke does this by way of the principle of translation.
20 This practice will be accepted here and throughout this work.
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Principle of Translation-If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that 
language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth 
(in that other language), (p. 114)
This principle is based on the assumption that two sentences in different languages can
express the same proposition. Without such a principle, there would be no way to
translate one language into another. With these assumptions in place, Kripke is ready to
derive his puzzle.
Kripke gives a clear example, which provides insight into the ensuing problem. 
Consider Pierre, who was raised in Paris and is a mono-linguistic French speaker who 
never left France; he sees brochures in French for the city of Londres. Pierre reads in 
French about Londres and makes a decision based on what he read that he could express 
by ‘Londres est jo lie \ Pierre asserts and believes the proposition expressed by ‘Londres 
est jo lie \  so by disquotation and the principle of translation it can be inferred that Pierre 
believes that London is pretty. After some time, Pierre moves to London and learns 
English by immersion. Pierre is placed in an unattractive area of London and never 
leaves this area. Due to the depressed area Pierre experiences in London, he asserts 
“London is not pretty.” Based on Kripke’s translation and disquotation principles, it 
can be said that Pierre believes a proposition and its negation. One might say that Pierre 
has changed his mind, but if asked, Pierre maintains all his beliefs from when he lived 
in Paris. Pierre would not hesitate to assert both that London is not pretty and that 
Londres est jolie.
What can be said of Pierre’s beliefs? Does Pierre believe that London is pretty 
or not? There is empirical evidence based on Pierre’s assertions to support both the 
attribution of the belief that London is pretty and the attribution of the belief that 
London is not pretty. So is Pierre irrational? It seems that this is not what one would 
want to claim, but based on direct reference semantics Pierre believes a proposition and 
its negation. Kripke has an underlying assumption that no rational person would do
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such a thing. Moreover, if it is accepted that Pierre is irrational, then given strengthened 
disquotation there is a contradiction for anyone asserting that Pierre believes the 
contradiction, since Pierre refuses to assert ‘London is pretty’. Strengthened 
disquotation implies that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. By asserting that 
Pierre believes that Londres est jolie and that he does not believe that London is pretty, 
we contradict ourselves. Strengthened disquotation is strong enough to imply that from 
Pierre’s refusal to assent to ‘London is pretty’ that Pierre does not believe that London 
is pretty. This is the puzzle.
The case of Pierre and London is clear example of the inability to substitute co- 
referring terms even in a de re belief ascription. ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are both 
names for London, in English and French respectively. According to direct reference, 
in the sentence ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty’ it is possible to substitute 
‘Londres’ for ‘London’ salva veritate since both names have the same import in the 
proposition. This claim is strengthened by the principle of translation. However, this is 
where the problem appears. If ‘Londres' takes the place of ‘London’, Pierre would 
never agree with such a sentence. He would likely be obstinately opposed to its 
assertion. Again, the question remains, does Pierre believe London is pretty or not? It 
seems that for Pierre, it depends on what term is used to refer to London. If that is the 
case, then there is a problem with the semantics of direct reference.
To push this even further, Kripke makes the claim that based on Pierre’s 
assertions we can claim that he does and does not believe London is pretty. Again, 
based on strengthened disquotation, Pierre’s reluctance to assent to ‘London is pretty’ 
implies that he does not believe that London is pretty, but his assertion of ‘Londres est 
jolie’ implies that he does believe that London is pretty, so there is a contradiction not 
just in Pierre’s head. The contradiction is not only something that Pierre believes, but
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can be attributed to anyone attributing both belief and non-belief to Pierre. Direct 
reference semantics leads to cases of clear contradictions when speakers try to make 
substitutions in belief contexts. It would seem, in opposition to direct reference, that 
there is some basis for thinking that it matters what term is used in reference.
In order to make things even more complicated, Kripke gives another example 
where the names do not differ. Consider Peter and Paderewski. Paderewski is both a 
politician and a pianist. Peter is aware of Paderewski’s success as a Polish statesman, 
and Peter has also heard of a great Polish pianist named ‘Paderewski’. Unknown to 
Peter, the pianist named ‘Paderewski’ and the statesman named ‘Paderewski’ are one 
and the same. According to Peter, there is no way that such a great pianist could also be 
the chief framer of the Polish Constitution. In this case, it can be said that Peter 
believes that Paderewski is a pianist and Peter believes Paderewski is not a pianist, 
along with the beliefs that Paderewski is a great statesman and that Paderewski is not a 
great statesman. According to the view of direct reference presented, it is clear that 
Peter believes contradictions, which would be reason to consider him irrational. But, it 
seems unintuitive to say that Peter is irrational. It is an extraordinary achievement to be 
both a great pianist and a great statesman. It is therefore reasonable of Peter to assume 
that there are two individuals both with the name ‘Paderewski’. There is nothing wrong 
with Peter’s logic. It is a legitimate assumption to believe that a great statesman is not a 
great musician, but this places Peter in the same situation as Pierre. Both Pierre and 
Peter believe of individuals respectively, that the individual has a property and does not 
have that property.
The Peter and Paderewski case is even more puzzling than that of Pierre and 
London. In this case, no substitution is made, yet it results in contradiction. Peter 
makes claims that seem to be obviously inconsistent. He is claiming that Paderewski is
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a pianist and that Paderewski is not a pianist. When Peter makes the assertions he uses 
the name ‘Paderewski’ in both utterances.
The propositional attitudes argument against direct reference is a clear argument 
with some basic assumptions. According to direct reference, de re belief is the belief in 
a singular proposition. The sentences (1) and (2) express the same singular proposition 
just as (3) and (4) express the same proposition:
(1) Cicero is an orator;
(2) Tully is an orator;
(3) Tom believes Cicero is an orator;
(4) Tom believes Tully is an orator.
A reflective speaker, like Tom, can believe that (1) expresses something true, while (2) 
expresses something false. This results in the inference being made that (3) is true and
(4) is false, but according to direct reference (3) and (4) express the same proposition, 
so they must either both be true or both false. It is assumed that if (1) and (2) express 
the same proposition, a reflective speaker will not believe that one is true and the other 
false. According to direct reference Tom believes a proposition and its negation are 
both true; therefore, Tom is either irrational or direct reference is incorrect. The key to 
the argument against direct reference is its assumption that a rational speaker would 
never believe a proposition and its negation. Direct reference is left in a difficult 
position against what seemed at first to be a clear explanation of de re belief.
Not Just a Problem for Direct Reference
When Kripke’s “A Puzzle about Belief’ is discussed, the focus is typically on 
the development of the puzzle. When responses are given to the puzzle, discussion is 
usually limited to the effect it has on direct reference theories. Kripke does more than
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present a puzzle for proponents of direct reference. In many cases, it is assumed that 
descriptive theories can handle the problem of propositional attitudes, and therefore 
should be preferred to that of direct reference. The first section of “A Puzzle about 
Belief’ gives an analysis of Frege and Russell that questions their ability to explain 
propositional attitudes. In many ways, what Kripke presents is a further argument 
against descriptivist theories placing both descriptive and direct reference theories on 
level ground in relation to the problem of propositional attitudes.
Descriptive theories claim to explain hesitations to substitute co-referring terms 
in propositional attitude ascriptions. As was seen with Frege, names cannot be validly 
substituted in subordinate clauses unless the terms have the same sense. Underlying this 
claim is the assumption that two names may have the same sense. For Russell, even if 
two names co-refer they will not have the same uniquely identifying definite 
description. Without sameness of sense, two terms cannot be substituted in embedded 
statements without the possibility of altering the truth-value. On descriptive theories the 
reluctance to substitute co-referring names in propositional attitudes is defended 
because in Fregean terms the thought believed will differ when the names have different 
senses. Believing one thought is not the same as believing another thought expressed 
by a sentence with a substitution instance of a co-referring term.
As was seen with Frege, there is an intuitive appeal to this view, but that appeal 
is lost when Frege is forced to consider indexicals and demonstratives. When indexicals 
and demonstratives are considered in propositional attitudes, it is worse for Frege. 
Consider Joe and Tim having a conversation where Joe sincerely says to Tim, “Micah is 
a thief.” Tim, knowing that Joe is a gossip, wants to tell Micah about the way Joe spoke 
about him behind his back. He later goes on to report the conversation to Micah. Tim 
says, “Joe believes that you are a thief’ to Micah; then, to other friends he says, “Joe
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believes that he [pointing at Micah] is a thief.” In doing this, Tim has substituted ‘you’ 
for ‘Micah’, and ‘he’ for ‘you’ or ‘Micah’. On Frege’s view, there is no way that the 
sense for ‘Micah’, ‘you’, or ‘he’ in the contexts of the utterances is the same, yet there is 
never any question as to the validity of the substitution. When speakers report the 
beliefs of others, they often do so by using indexicals or demonstratives. The terms 
substituted do not have the same sense, but are typically substituted. The sameness of 
sense requirement fails when indexicals and demonstratives are considered. This is a 
problem for descriptive explanations of propositional attitudes, but it is not the one 
Kripke presents. Kripke presents the puzzle in such a way that the senses become 
irrelevant and the puzzle is a puzzle for all theories of names.
Sameness of sense or sameness of descriptions, in attitude ascriptions is not 
sufficient to bolster descriptivism beyond Kripke’s earlier criticisms. Failure of co- 
referring terms can no longer be considered as solely due to differing senses for names 
(p. 110). Two names with the same sense can result in the failure to substitute co- 
referring terms in attitude ascriptions. Given the translation principle, ‘London’ and 
‘Londres’ have the same sense, so if (5) and (6) do differ in truth-value, this cannot be 
due to different senses:
(5) Pierre believes London is pretty;
(6) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie.
Differences in sense no longer explain away the seemingly irrational nature of Pierre’s 
beliefs. This can also be seen with ‘Paderewski’:
(7) Peter believes Paderewski is a statesman;
(8) Peter believes Paderewski is not a statesman.
According to the description given for Peter, both (7) and (8) seem true, so Peter is 
ascribed contradictory beliefs. Kripke sees this as wrong, so we have this puzzle (p.
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131). Descriptive theories of names do not help here, just as in the Pierre case. With 
Pierre, the same sense was given to ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ through the principle of 
translation, while with Peter the same name is used, by us note. Whatever descriptive 
content, or other sense, ‘Paderewski’ is given, it is the same in both reports since it is we 
who use the same name twice in these reports. The criticism of direct reference was 
that there must be different senses for names in order to explain why names should not 
be substituted in attitude ascriptions. The examples that Kripke gave question this since 
his examples do not differ in sense.
A descriptivist might respond by claiming that regarding ‘London’ and 
‘Londres ’ the principle of translation can be denied. In doing so, each name is 
considered part of a different idiolect and is untranslatable. This will only slow Kripke’s 
puzzle since it might discredit one example. Kripke’s example of ‘Paderewski’ requires 
no translation, as it only requires a single name. Any response to Kripke’s puzzle must 
explain why the problem exists for cases where there is only one name, such as 
‘Paderewski’, as well as cases where the names differ.
Overall, Kripke is presenting a new attack against descriptivism that differs from 
his previous arguments in Naming and Necessity. Descriptivism claims that direct 
reference cannot account for differences in the truth-value of (3) and (4). Descriptivists 
have that intuition; for otherwise, we are left asserting (3) and (3n):
(3n) Tom believes Cicero is not an orator.
It seems now that Tom should be credited with being irrational. Kripke disagrees and 
claims that the descriptivist’s claim that the names have different senses, and therefore 
the sentences can have different truth-values, does not solve the problem. The problem 
does not arise for Tom, but only when the attributions are made. It is the attributers of 
belief that give ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ the same sense, and it is for us that there is one
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name ‘Paderewski’ with a single sense (p. 125). In Kripke’s examples, the claim that 
there are multiple senses is not available, since it was us that used the terms, and in the 
language of the belief report the names ‘London’ and ‘Londres ’ are synonyms and 
‘Paderewski’ is a single name. Avoidance of (3) and (3n) was the reason for giving 
different senses to ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, but no such move is available in (5) and (6), or
(7) and (8). Reluctance to assert (3) and (4) should not be evidence in support of 
descriptive theories over direct reference. Any solution given for (5) and (6), or (7) and
(8), will aptly apply to (3) and (3n) making descriptivism superfluous and discrediting 
its motivation.
Kripke’s claims do not show direct reference handles propositional attitude 
ascriptions any better than descriptive explanations, but do show that descriptive 
explanations lack any clear advantage over direct reference. What Kripke has done is 
shown that there is no reason to favour the Fregean account over the direct reference 
account in respect to propositional attitude ascriptions. An area where direct reference 
is often considered inferior to descriptivism is now an area where both views can be 
considered problematic.
Propositional attitudes present a clear problem for direct reference and a 
problem for descriptivism when non-ideal situations are considered. No one theory can 
be favoured over the other based on typical handling of propositional attitudes. In other 
aspects of language, direct reference presented a correct analysis of reference. A 
common move is to reject direct reference in favour of descriptivism because of the way 
each handles propositional attitude ascriptions. Since there is no reason to favour 
descriptivism over direct reference with regard to attitude ascriptions, other aspects of 
the theories should reflect which theory is favoured. Direct reference gives a clear
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picture of reference in other areas, so instead of rejecting it, a solution to the attitude
problem for direct reference should be sought.
Before solutions can be considered, some notes on Kripke’s assumptions must
be made. Based on considerations from chapters 4 and 5, the disquotation principle and
principle of translation must be strengthened. The disquotation principle must be
strengthened to incorporate membership in a name-using practice. If a speaker cannot
grasp the proposition asserted, then her sincere assertion is not enough for belief. So the
disquotation principle should be:
Disquotation Principle*-If a normal English Speaker who is the member of a 
name-using practice n, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p ’, where ‘p ’ is a 
sentence containing V , then he believes that p.
This takes into consideration a speakers place in the name-using practice.
Kripke’s principle of translation must also be strengthened. If the principle is
held as Kripke states it, then non-co-referring names could be translated because all
names have the same character, and are therefore synonyms. A clear strengthening of
the principle of translation that would satisfy these conditions is required, but at this
point requires more development. This goes beyond the scope of this project, but it is
clear that the principle cannot be stated strictly in terms of extension, since this would
mean that co-extensive predicates could be translated even when there would be no
reason to do so based on character.
75
7. Pragmatic Responses to the Problem of 
Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
Pragmatics
In dealing with the substitution of co-referring terms in propositional attitude 
ascriptions many solutions have been presented. In a view based on Quine, Graeme 
Forbes (1997) claims that de re attitude ascriptions are of the person ‘so-called’.
Others, such as Larson and Segal (1995), claim that the interpreted logical form of a 
sentence dictates that when substitutions are made there is a new truth-condition for the 
new sentence. Still others support descriptive analyses of attitude ascriptions.
Recently some philosophers, such as Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames 
(2002), have given pragmatic analyses of propositional attitude ascriptions. Their claim 
is that there is more information than the semantic content in an utterance. The 
semantics of direct reference gives the truth-conditions for statements containing 
directly referential terms, but there is more to an utterance than the semantics.
Pragmatic responses claim that there is information, in addition to the semantic 
information, that is pragmatically imparted in an utterance. Pragmatic analyses, such as 
those given by Salmon and Soames, claim that pragmatic information is often confused 
with semantic information; in many cases, the information, which is pragmatic, is often 
wrongly considered semantic by theorists and the general body of language users.
Pragmatic responses are based on the observations put forward by H.P. Grice 
(1989). Grice claimed that there are often cases where more is expressed than what 
semantics offers. Consider the way speakers use ‘and’. Truth-functionally, the 
connective ‘and’ can connect two sentences and have a value of true just so long as both 
conjuncts are true. Often speakers use ‘and’ to do something more than this. In some
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instances, speakers of English use ‘and’ to express temporal ordering. ‘P and Q’ often 
means P happened and then Q happened, but the semantics do not require, or express, 
this. Semantically, ‘Jack turned the key and the car started’ has the same value as ‘The 
car started and Jack turned the key’. Some speakers might refrain from uttering the 
latter because pragmatically speakers use ‘and’ to express temporal order, and that 
would impart information that is anachronistic.
Information that goes beyond what is semantically expressed by a sentence, or 
sentences, is known as an implicature. Consider the sentence ‘I am David’, which has 
the semantic content, or proposition expressed, ((object, object), identity), i.e. ((David, 
David), identity). This sentence can convey different information within different 
contexts. It can be assumed that the context is an introduction such that the speaker, 
introducing himself, utters ‘I am David’. It is clear that what the speaker is trying to 
convey could be better stated as ‘My name is ‘David” . This is not what was 
semantically expressed by the sentence. The semantic content of the sentence is the 
same as the speaker uttering ‘I am me’, ‘David is David’, and someone else uttering ‘He 
is he’, all of which seem in the present context to be ridiculous things to say. There is a 
conventional implicature that takes place when the string of words ‘I am David’ is 
uttered. It may happen in this way. A participant is in a given context where she wants 
to learn the speaker’s name. The speaker utters ‘I am David’; semantically expressing 
that o is o relative to the assignment of David to o. The listener does some reasoning; 
this is probably done sub-consciously, based on the words chosen. She knows that ‘I* is 
a way for the speaker to refer to himself. The speaker said that he is David. The 
listener knows that the speaker is David. ‘David’ was the term chosen to refer to David; 
the listener makes the inference that because ‘David’ was used to refer to the speaker, 
‘David’ is the speaker’s name. In this way, by saying ‘I am David’, the speaker implies
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the information that could have been stated by ‘My name is ‘David” . The truth of the 
original statement along with conventions of the language brings the listener from a 
statement of identity to the implied attribution of a name. This is a custom of English 
users. The same custom may occur within other cultures, but it does not matter; this is a 
custom that is used by speakers of English, and is clearly a case where what is 
pragmatically imparted goes beyond the semantics of the terms based on inferences and 
conventions.
Pragmatic explanations of propositional attitude ascriptions depend on speakers 
conveying more information than the semantic content of an utterance. According to 
direct reference, the semantic content of a name is just its referent, so the semantic 
content of a true sentence of the form ‘ni is n25 is that o is o under the assignment of o to 
the names ‘nj ’ and ‘n25. Semantically there is not much to identity statements, so 
pragmatics does most of the work in situations like this. An utterance of ‘Cicero is 
Tully’ conveys the information that the statement is true and that the two names are co- 
referential. In the same way, ‘Cicero was an orator’ imparts the information that 
someone bears the name ‘Cicero’. This is not information semantically expressed.
It is instances such as those stated above, as well as common rhetorical devices 
such as sarcasm, metaphor, and irony, that inspired views such as those put forward by 
Salmon and Soames. Yet, they each have different approaches and applications of 
pragmatics. Salmon uses pragmatics to explain how directly referential terms carry 
information beyond reference. Soames uses pragmatics in line with his semantic 
pluralism. For Soames, utterances can express more than one proposition. With each 
utterance, there is a range of propositions asserted. Some of these propositions are 
pragmatic propositions carrying information beyond semantic content. Both pragmatic
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approaches will be considered starting with Soames and then moving to Salmon, due to 
the appeal that the latter’s view has.
Pluralistic Pragmatic Assertions
In trying to deal with co-referential names within attitude ascriptions, Soames 
presents a pragmatic solution to the problem. According to Soames, the semantic 
content of a name is simply its referent. This is where the problem of attitude 
ascriptions arises. Attitude ascriptions appear to be, as Quine called them, referentially 
opaque. A referentially opaque context does not allow the substitution of co-referring 
names. When we try to substitute co-referring names into a belief attribution it 
intuitively seems to change the truth-value, but if  the semantic content of a name is 
simply its referent, this cannot be so. What follows will be Soames’s account of attitude 
ascriptions that he provides in Beyond Rigidity (2002), in addition to some criticisms of 
his approach.
Soames claims that in non-metaphorical contexts the semantic proposition is 
expressed, i.e. singular propositions where names or demonstratives are used, but there 
are cases where the context is non-metaphorical and there is also a pragmatic 
proposition asserted and intended. Soames introduces what he calls ‘partially 
descriptive names’. Paradigm examples of partially descriptive names are ‘New York 
City’, ‘Prof. Saul Kripke’, and ‘Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’. Names such as these carry 
descriptive information that a speaker must grasp in order to understand the names. A 
speaker cannot be credited with competence with the name ‘New York City’ if she does 
not know that it is a city, or with ‘Philadelphia Pennsylvania’ if she does not know that 
Philadelphia is in Pennsylvania.21 Soames claims that partially descriptive names
21 ‘Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’ differs from ‘Philadelphia’. A speaker can be competent with 
‘Philadelphia’ and not know it is in Pennsylvania, but cannot be competent with ‘Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania’ without knowing it is in Pennsylvania.
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express information of the form ‘.. .the x: Dx & x = « ...’, so the semantic content for 
‘Prof. Saul Kripke’ could also be expressed by ‘the x such that x is a professor, and x is 
Saul Kripke’ (p. 88). It is also Soames’s claim that in some non-metaphorical contexts
ordinary, linguistically simple, proper names pragmatically impart information that
• 22would be the same as the semantic information if they were partially descriptive. 
Soames would claim that this information is apparent among friends or a particular 
group. When some philosophers use ‘Plato’ it may be in a way such that ‘Plato said 
that... ’ is used to express ‘Plato, the greatest philosopher, said that... ’. Two users of a 
name need not believe that the descriptive information applies, but for the hearer to 
grasp the pragmatic proposition, she must be aware that the speaker believes it.
Soames is not rejecting semantics for a pragmatic account of language. In most 
ordinary contexts it is the semantic content that is intended to be asserted. When a 
speaker uses a proper name along with a predicate, or two names and a two-place 
predicate, she simply means the object(s) and the property, or relation. The semantic 
proposition that is expressed is what any competent language user would understand, or 
express, in any non-metaphorical context. Though metaphorical contexts are common, 
and contexts where a pragmatic proposition is the intended proposition are also 
common, it can be maintained that in most contexts the primary proposition intended is 
the semantic proposition (p. 228).
Within contexts where it appears that the semantic proposition is the only 
proposition expressed, there may be a pragmatic proposition that the speaker is trying to 
assert. Among friends it would not be incorrect to say that particular words have an 
enhanced meaning, e.g. as was seen with information associated with name-using
22 Soames uses ‘linguistically simple proper name’ in contrast to ‘partially descriptive names’. A 
linguistically simple proper name is just a name that has its referent as its semantic content, whereas a 
partially descriptive name’s semantic content is partially descriptive as is seen above. While discussing 
Soames’s position and criticisms of his view, I will use his terminology in order to avoid confusion.
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practices. Soames makes this claim with regard to names. According to Soames, in 
some contexts, often among friends sharing an acquaintance, speakers and hearers may 
associate some descriptive information D with a name V . In cases such as this, an 
assertive utterance of a sentence that includes V ,  i.e. ‘ may express the 
proposition expressed by ‘.. .the x : Dx & x=n.. . However, the descriptive content of 
such an expression, and that which is associated with V ,  varies over contexts, so the 
description is limited to a contextually defined group that happen to share that 
descriptive content (p. 210). Soames claims that this is what happens within many 
attitude ascriptions.
Soames accepts that there is a plurality of propositions asserted when a speaker 
makes an utterance. These propositions range over possible information asserted. 
Above, it was claimed that speakers make inferences from semantic content to 
metaphorical content, or pragmatic content. Soames claims something different. He 
claims that there is a range of propositions, Pi, ..., Pn, asserted with an utterance. 
Speakers intend any one proposition, but all are asserted (p. 69, 215). The range of 
propositions is such that the speaker can intend any one of them and they must together 
cover any proposition that the speaker might intend. Within this range of propositions, 
there is an intended proposition that in the case of, for example, successful metaphor 
and sarcasm is generally the understood proposition. Those present still have to make 
inferences (probably unconsciously) that lead to the intended proposition, but 
nonetheless, the intended pragmatic proposition is asserted along with the semantic 
proposition, if different.
When we consider attitude ascriptions, as in Kripke’s puzzles, our intuition tells 
us that the substitution of co-referring names does not maintain truth-value. Mary may 
believe that Fn but claims that she does not believe Fm, where ‘n ’ and ‘m ’ refer to the
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same object and our intuitions say this is ok. The problem, as stated above, is that the 
proposition expressed by ‘Mary believes that Fn’ and ‘Mary believes that Fm’ are the 
same according to direct reference, but since we know that Mary claims that she does 
not believe the proposition expressed by ‘Fm’ there is a tendency to judge the latter 
belief-report as expressing something false while the former something true. The 
account that Soames gives, when applied to attitude ascriptions, results in maintaining 
these intuitions regarding truth-value. Soames claims that in some contexts there is a 
pragmatic proposition expressed but it would be better expressed by a sentence 
containing a partially descriptive name. In such a case, the pragmatic proposition is 
expressed along with the semantic proposition, where the pragmatic proposition may 
have descriptive content related to the name used. It is the pragmatic proposition that is 
believed by Mary, and since the pragmatic propositions may vary according to which 
name is used in the sentence there is no conflict, the two sentences express different 
pragmatic propositions: one that contains the object o and a description Di; another that 
contains o and a description D2. Mary’s beliefs are such that she believes two pragmatic 
propositions that are not contradictory, i.e. she believes that the x:D\x & x = n is F  and 
does not believe that the x\Dix 8cx = n \sF , but it would be incorrect to express those 
propositions with sentences that make the original pragmatic proposition the semantic 
proposition of the new sentence.
This point can be illustrated further. Consider three friends Tom, Dick, and 
Harry. These three friends all drink coffee in the same cafe, where it happens that Peter 
Hempel also drinks coffee. Though none of them are close friends with Peter Hempel 
they are acquainted with him to the extent that they speak to him on occasion and know 
that his name is ‘Peter Hempel’. Tom, Dick, and Harry all share similar descriptive
23 This is one of the examples that Soames gives. I here condense and restate it.
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information regarding Peter Hempel; they think of him as the elderly, white haired man 
of their acquaintance. Tom, Dick, and Harry have also read some philosophy of science 
materials by Carl Hempel. The three friends again share a description associated with 
‘Carl Hempel’ such that he is a famous philosopher.
Now, one day Tom happens to read in the newspaper that the philosopher Carl 
Hempel died, he then reports this information to Dick. He says (1):
(1) Carl Hempel died last week.
According to direct reference, (1) expresses a proposition concerning the man, Mr. 
Hempel, and the property of having died last week. Since ‘Peter Hempel’ and ‘Carl 
Hempel’ are co-referring names, in (1) we should be able to substitute ‘Peter Hempel’ 
for ‘Carl Hempel’ and maintain the truth-value, since both sentences would express the 
same proposition.
(2) Peter Hempel died last week.
The truth-value of (1) and (2) is dependent on the object alone. We can extend the 
scenario a bit further. Dick, knowing that his friend Harry would care to know this, 
decides to tell him in the form of (3):
(3) Tom believes that Carl Hempel died last week.
If we applied the same substitution to (3), we get (4), but in this case our intuition leads 
us to question whether or not the truth-value can be maintained, although according to 
direct reference it should.
(4) Tom believes that Peter Hempel died last week.
If asked, Tom would not assent to the sentence ‘Peter Hempel died last week’ even 
though this is what he semantically asserted when he uttered (1). Soames’s pragmatic 
analysis regarding contextually related descriptions and pragmatic propositions claims 
to explain why this is so.
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When we consider the information that we have regarding Tom, Dick, and 
Harry, we know that they all share the information that Carl Hempel is a famous 
philosopher. Soames claims that Tom’s actual belief regarding Mr. Hempel, and that he 
died last week, could be better expressed by (3a).
(3a) Tom believes that the famous philosopher, Carl Hempel, died last 
week.
The proposition expressed by (3a) is the pragmatic proposition that Tom believes. If 
Tom were to believe the semantic proposition embedded in (3), he would also believe 
the semantic proposition of (4), but Tom would never assent to a sentence like (4) 
because the belief that Tom would have in (4) is the belief in a pragmatic proposition 
that is expressed by (4a) (p. 218):
(4a) Tom believes that the elderly white haired man of our acquaintance, 
Peter Hempel, died last week.
Tom might also believe the semantic proposition, but it is the pragmatic proposition, 
which he primarily believes. Propositional attitudes should be understood as a special 
context. Within certain contexts, such as ones containing friends like Tom, Dick, and 
Harry, the friends are aware of the pragmatic propositions that are related to expressions 
containing names shared by individuals in the context.
Understanding utterances of sentences ascribing propositional attitudes as 
contextually expressing pragmatic propositions gives the result that the objects of the 
attitudes will not be contradictory. Two sentences differing only by the substitution of a 
co-referring name, will express at least some different pragmatic propositions. Within 
some contexts, speakers, or groups of speakers, associate a description with a name.
This description is in no way part of the meaning of the name, but may be shared by a 
contextually defined group of speakers. In such a case, when that group uses that name
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to express a proposition, they express a descriptively enhanced pragmatic proposition 
that each person within that context can understand; but, an outsider might not associate 
the same descriptive information and therefore not apprehend the same pragmatic 
proposition.24 Also, the pragmatic proposition does not contain only the description, but 
also the object. Since there is not the description alone in the proposition, but also the 
object, it can easily be seen how it is that those who do not share descriptions can still 
communicate, at least the semantic proposition.
By appealing to pragmatics, and claiming that linguistically simple proper 
names act as partially descriptive names in propositional attitude ascriptions, Soames 
has side-stepped the issue of de re belief as belief of a singular proposition. No longer 
do individuals believe singular propositions. Speakers now believe complex, 
pragmatically imparted propositions comprising an individual(s) and descriptive 
information in addition to properties or relations. There are two issues that arise from 
Soames analysis. The first is regarding what is left of belief regarding singular 
propositions; the other is the application of his analysis to contexts other than belief.
As presented, it seems as though Soames’s picture gives a clean analysis of 
belief ascriptions. There is no contradiction in uttering ‘Mary believes that Fm’ and 
‘Mary does not believe that Fn’, since Mary believes two disparate pragmatic 
propositions. There is still a question remaining: what is Mary’s attitude toward the 
singular proposition? Is the report of the belief in the semantic proposition true or 
false? There is no explanation of whether or not Mary believes that o, the referent of 
‘m’ and ‘n ’, is F. Soames gives his analysis, but never explains what attitude the 
subject has toward the singular semantic proposition itself. It seems that Soames’s 
general line is that it will always be a pragmatic proposition that is believed. Further,
24 Since the descriptive content is variable across contexts and speakers, and is not part of the meaning of 
the term, it does not have to answer to Kripke’s modal argument. The relevant aspect to Kripke’s 
arguments is the semantic content.
85
since a plurality of propositions is asserted, it is unclear how the truth-value of the 
assertions should be evaluated, i.e. whether the assertion is true if and only if all 
asserted propositions are true, or if and only if the intended proposition is true.
There is a further, and more damaging problem when Soames’s pragmatic 
account is applied to veridical propositional attitudes such as knowledge. If it is 
assumed that knowledge requires belief in a true proposition, there will be instances 
where the speaker should be credited with knowledge, but cannot be if the intended 
proposition is a false pragmatic proposition containing descriptive information that is 
false. Knowledge is veridical, so any known proposition must be true. And any 
analysis of knowledge will have to take into account that the individual must believe the 
proposition. Based on Soames’s pragmatic analysis of belief ascriptions, belief is of a 
pragmatic proposition. The truth or falsity of these partially descriptive pragmatic 
propositions will not always be the same as that of the semantic proposition. The truth- 
value of a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a partially descriptive name 
will depend on the individual satisfying the description. If we want to claim that Ralph 
knows that Ortcutt is a spy, but he has pragmatic belief in a proposition that would be 
better expressed by ‘Ortcutt, the man he [Ralph] saw yesterday in a brown hat, is a spy’, 
and this is the proposition we intend when we claim that Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a 
spy, but Ortcutt has never worn a brown hat, then that pragmatic proposition is not true. 
Therefore, it seems that our claim that Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy is false. 
However, the semantic proposition expressed by ‘Ralph knows Ortcutt is a spy’ should 
be intuitively true; Ralph has justified reasons to believe that Ortcutt is a spy, and 
Ortcutt is a spy. Ralph has simply added a trivial piece of false information about 
Ortcutt. But on Soames’s view, if Ralph believes the false pragmatic proposition, then
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Ralph does not know that Ortcutt is a spy. Soames’s explanation is specious, since it
25fails in some attributions of veridical propositional attitudes.
There is also reason to question whether or not descriptive information is 
asserted when a linguistically simple name is used. There is reason to believe that 
speakers associate similar information with the same name, but this is explained by 
information shared within a name-using practice. When a speaker invokes a name- 
using practice, all information known by the current users, i.e. in the current 
conversation, can be considered germane. There is some information that the speakers 
assume their audience is familiar with. Assertions are made with the hope that from this 
information the participants can make the correct inferences, but intuitively the speaker 
does not assert all possible inferences. Soames claims that speakers might utter 
‘.. .David Lewis.. . but intend something similar to that which is expressed by ‘.. .the 
philosopher David Lewis.. He claims that if ordinary speakers were questioned, they 
would think this correct. All that seems correct is that speakers tend to associate 
information with a name in line with common information, or misinformation in the 
name-using practice. If questioned, the reason speakers would want that information 
made salient is so that it is determinate which name-using practice each is participating 
in, which is not to say that this information is part of what is asserted in the normal use 
of the practice.
Soames seems to give an account of belief ascriptions that avoids the problem of
conflicting beliefs based on pragmatics, but it is questionable how far his account can
go. The initial intuition that Soames has seems to be that there is more information
conveyed than that which is semantic. It is questionable whether or not he applies this
insight correctly. Changing belief ascriptions to ascriptions of attitudes toward
25 This is not limited to knowledge. The same example could be used for all relational predicates that 
relate an individual with a proposition that requires the proposition to be true, such as ‘saw’ and Teamed 
that’.
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pragmatic propositions, instead of semantic propositions, resulted in problems for 
Soames. Further, it is questionable whether Soames’s claim that there is a plurality of 
propositions asserted with the utterance of a sentence is correct. Pragmatic information 
is generally conveyed through utterances, but that information is often based on 
inferences or customs.
Modes of Acquisition and Pragmatics
Another analysis that implements pragmatics is given by Salmon. Salmon does 
not use pragmatics in the same way as Soames, but it will be seen that they have 
common characteristics. Where Soames used pragmatics with pluralistic assertions, 
Salmon takes a different approach. Salmon uses pragmatics, as Soames, as an 
explanation of the presence of information in addition to semantic information, but does 
not see a plurality of propositions asserted. There is the semantic content conveyed by 
an utterance, but pragmatics imparts further information that is not part of semantics. 
Salmon does not claim that the pragmatic information is asserted as a proposition, or 
propositions, as Soames claims; rather, it is in some cases imparted as part of the full 
information that a sentence can convey. Pragmatics plays a large part in Salmon’s 
theory, but the key to Salmon’s view is what he calls ‘modes of acquaintance’ with, and 
‘modes of apprehension’ of, propositions. Salmon gives a pragmatic and psychological 
explanation that gets closer to the root of the problem than Soames.26
In Frege’s Puzzle, Salmon (1986) sets out to reformulate Frege’s puzzle of 
identity, or ‘Frege’s puzzle’ as he calls it, and give a solution to it. Frege’s puzzle is 
generally based on identity, as was seen in chapter one, but Salmon claims that it is not 
only a puzzle regarding identity since the puzzle can be formed with any predicate. For
26 Psychological explanations are a step toward the root problem. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
differing mental representations for an object cause speakers to make the utterances they do and have the 
beliefs they do. It is wrong to look at belief attributions as simply a linguistic phenomenon and disregard 
brain states, term acquisition, and contexts.
this reason, it is a problem regarding information (1986, p. 12). If we assume that the 
Superman story is true, we can consider ‘If Superman can fly, then Clark Kent can’ and 
‘If Superman can fly then Superman can’. Any instance where the latter expresses a true 
proposition the former does also, yet the former seems a posteriori and the latter a 
priori. Instances such as these led Salmon to present the puzzle as attitudes toward 
information.
In part, Salmon relies on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. 
When speakers utter sentences they use words to encode information and express that 
information. Primarily, information is semantically encoded. Terms represent objects, 
relations, and properties. This information is expressed as the semantic content of 
sentences. There is also pragmatic information imparted by an utterance. Consider (5) 
and (6):
(5) Clark Kent is Superman;
(6) Clark Kent is Clark Kent.
Both (5) and (6) express the same semantic information, but differ syntactically and 
impart different pragmatic information. (5) imparts the information that ‘Clark Kent’ 
and ‘Superman’ are co-referential; there is no way that (6) can impart this information. 
Often, speakers confuse this pragmatic information with the semantic information. 
Consider (7) and (8):
(7) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is Superman;
(8) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is Clark Kent.
The truth-value of (7) and (8) depends on Lois Lane’s attitude toward the proposition 
expressed by (5) and (6), which is the same. So the truth-value of the proposition 
expressed by (7) and (8) should always be the same. It is the failure to recognise the 
pragmatic information as pragmatic instead of semantic that leads speakers to the
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intuition that (7) and (8) differ in truth-value. The information that Clark Kent is also 
named ‘Superman’ is pragmatically imparted by (5), but not (6). Ordinary language 
users without any precise distinction between pragmatic and semantic content would not 
differentiate between the two. But, there could be those that are fully aware of the 
semantic and pragmatic distinction and still believe (7) is false while (8) true because 
knowledge of the distinction does not guarantee knowledge such as the fact that 
‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are co-referential.
Under a Fregean conception, a particular thought cannot be confused with 
another thought, since it cannot be represented in any other way. Fregean thoughts 
differ from singular propositions. Since singular propositions involve individual 
objects, and someone can fail to recognise the object, it is not incorrect to say that 
someone fails to recognise a singular proposition. An agent is acquainted with different 
objects in different ways, and, at times, with the same object in different ways. Since 
objects are the constituents of singular propositions the mode of acquaintance for the 
object will be part of the mode of acquaintance with the singular proposition; the way in 
which an agent is acquainted with an individual will be the way in which the 
proposition is grasped, or apprehended (1986, p. 108). These modes of acquaintance, 
resulting in modes of apprehension, are the ways by which the proposition is 
recognised. The appearance of an object plays a vital role in an agent’s ability to 
recognise it. Consider the appearance, or guise, of an object at a time, t\, when we 
suppose an agent gains her only acquaintance with the object. She might at a later time, 
t2, have a thought regarding the object, wherein the cognitive value of the thought at t2 
may in part have the mode of acquaintance from t\ as part of the appearance of the 
thought for the agent (p. 109). Different modes of apprehension for a proposition result 
in speakers failing to recognise a familiar proposition and in turn not recognising that
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proposition as one that is already believed. With modes of apprehension established, 
Salmon can begin to explain why individuals might assent to statements expressing 
conflicting singular propositions. However, before he can do this, he must find a way to 
incorporate this into a replacement for the dyadic belief relation.
In order for Salmon to incorporate modes of apprehension into an explanation of 
de re belief, he makes a controversial claim. Salmon’s claim is that ordinary speakers 
often incorrectly use terms such as ‘believes’ and ‘knows’. Salmon admits that when 
considering language analysis it is often beneficial to consider ordinary language users, 
but he also claims that in some cases these speakers cannot be relied upon for 
application conditions for predicates like ‘belief (p. 84). According to direct reference, 
the proposition expressed by (7) is true because that proposition is the same proposition 
as that expressed by (8). Ordinary usage of ‘belief results in speakers speaking falsely. 
Ordinary usage is such that speakers would usually claim that (7) expresses something 
false while (8) expresses something true. But, regardless of how inappropriate this may 
seem, an utterance of (7) still expresses a true proposition. Salmon admits that the onus 
is on proponents of direct reference to explain why customary use, and intuition, is 
different from that which is presented by direct reference. Initially, his response is a 
reminder of the distinction between semantically encoded and pragmatically imparted 
information (p. 84). This distinction, and speakers' confusion with regard to, or lack of 
understanding of, the distinction is only part of Salmon’s response.
The crux of Salmon’s claim is that the dyadic predicate ‘belief is inadequate in 
expressing the belief in a proposition. Just as individuals fail to recognise individuals, 
they can fail to recognise pieces of information. As has been seen with the semantic 
and pragmatic distinction, sentences encode information in different ways; two 
sentences can encode the same piece of semantic information while imparting different
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pragmatic information. Since the same semantic information can be encoded in 
different ways it is not impossible for an individual to fail to recognise the same piece of 
information encoded in a different way. The same proposition can appear under 
different guises. A speaker can acquire the same proposition under each of these 
different guises. It is Salmon’s claim that propositions are not perceived through the 
senses, but they are encountered by grasping or apprehending them (p. 106). But, since 
a singular proposition comprises its parts, which are objects, properties, and relations, 
someone’s apprehension of a singular proposition must be in some part by the means in 
which she is acquainted with each part of the proposition (p. 108). In this way, there are 
guises or appearances for singular propositions. The failure to recognise these modes of 
apprehension leads to inappropriate use by ordinary speakers.
By rejecting ‘believes’ as a dyadic predicate and replacing it with a further 
analysis that considers belief itself to be a ternary relation, Salmon claims that belief 
ascriptions are easily explained. Salmon claims that belief should be analysed as the 
“disposition to inward assent or agreement when taken in such-and-such a way” (p.
111). This analysis is the truth-conditions for the belief, i.e. it is the metaphysics of 
belief. Salmon presents this analysis of belief in the following way:
(i) \A believesp] may be analyzed as (3x)[^4 graspsp  by means ofx  &
BEL(A,p,x)];
(ii) A may stand in BEL to p  and some x  by means of which A grasps p,
without standing in BEL to p  and all jc by means of which A grasps 
P•
(iii) r A withholds belief from p ~\.. .may be analyzed as (3x)[A grasps p  
by means of x &~BEL(A,p,x)]. (1986, p. I l l )
The analysis of belief is given in terms of BEL. lBEL ’ represents a ternary relation that
incorporates modes of apprehension into belief. When speakers believe a singular
proposition, that proposition is believed under a mode of apprehension. BEL is the fact
of the matter when they use ‘believes’, but by using ‘believes’ there is no way to
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express the mode of apprehension. Salmon’s (i)-(iii) is given as the analysis of the fact 
of *A believes p ’ more fully. When we say ‘A believes p \  there is a way in which A 
grasps p\ the way in which A grasps p  is then considered as relevant in the attribution of 
belief, or BEL, ofp  to A. This explains why speakers are disposed to assent or dissent 
from an utterance. A believes p  only if there is a mode of apprehension of p  for A and A 
BELs p  by way of the relevant mode of apprehension of p.
This explains speakers’ attitudes, but it would be too much to change language 
to incorporate this ternary relation. Instead, Salmon claims that we use our words to 
“fake it” by using the dyadic predicate and ‘that’-clauses to represent belief. ‘That’- 
clauses specify the proposition believed, and it can be assumed that it pragmatically 
imparts the way that the proposition is taken by the agent to whom belief is ascribed (p.
116). This implicit way of “faking it”, i.e. by using words that pragmatically impart the 
mode of acquaintance, enables speakers to communicate the mode of apprehension that 
would satisfy the existential quantifier and third argument in the BEL relation. Salmon 
puts this into practice to show how it might look. Consider the previous example of 
Lois Lane and Clark Kent.27 Lois Lane’s belief that Clark Kent is Superman can be 
analysed by the ternary relation BEL in the following way:
(9) BEL[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Clark Kent,/(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent
is Clark Kent’)];
and
(10) BEL[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Superman,/[(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent 
is Clark Kent’)];
but not
(11) BEL[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Clark Kent,/(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent 
is Superman’)];
and not
(12) BEL[Lois Lane, Clark Kent is Superman,/(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent 
is Superman’)].28
27 Salmon (1986, p. 117) uses ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to make this point.
28 These take the same form as Salmon’s (1986, p. 117) examples.
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In (9)-(12), it can be seen that that there are two ways that Lois is acquainted with the 
same proposition. (9) and (10) both represent the way by which Lois is disposed to 
assent to the proposition and (11) and (12) do not. The value of function, ft(x,S), is the 
way by which an individual, x , takes the information expressed by sentence £ at a time t 
(1986, p. 117). Function^*,iS) is a function from arguments x and the sentence S to, as 
value, one of x’s modes of apprehension of the proposition expressed by S. The 
arguments for the function in this case are Lois and different sentences all expressing 
the same proposition. In these cases, (9) and (10) are true, while (11) and (12) are false. 
This is in line with the original intuitions and is further explained because it gives the 
way Lois is acquainted with the information. Speakers pragmatically indicate the way 
the relevant subjects are acquainted with propositions by the sentences used to express 
those propositions.
When belief reports are given, these reports suggest the information by which 
the agent is acquainted with the proposition believed. Speakers fake BEL by the words 
used. It is inappropriate to utter (7) instead of (8) because (7) does not impart the way 
in which Lois is acquainted with the proposition. (7) pragmatically imparts information 
that is false and represented by (11) and (12). By instead uttering (8), a speaker 
pragmatically imparts the true information similar to (9) and (10). Both (7) and (8) are, 
strictly speaking, true, but pragmatically impart different information. This information 
becomes relevant when considering dispositions and how a person will react to 
utterances made by other people. Salmon’s solution is not just a claim about semantics 
and pragmatics, but is an analysis of belief, i.e. the metaphysical state. Belief in a 
singular proposition is more complex than that which can be semantically expressed by 
‘believes’. The differences that remain between the ordinary usage of ‘believes’ and
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Salmon’s analysis can be explained by his metaphysical account of what beliefs are and 
by pragmatics.
The introduction of the ternary relation, BEL, allows Salmon to give an analysis 
of belief as it should be, not as speakers use it. This gives the explanation of conflicting 
beliefs. It seems to be left implicit in Salmon’s exposition that two modes of 
apprehension will result in two different appearances for cognitive content. It is clear 
that the mode of acquaintance/apprehension will affect the appearance of the thought for 
the thinker, which allows failure to recognise propositions, and in the end results in two 
distinct arguments for the BEL function, wherein the individual can BEL and -BEL the 
same proposition (p. 109). Modes of apprehension have explanatory power because 
belief is psychological. Salmon’s application of these modes of apprehension, in the 
ternary BEL relation forces him into saying that ordinary speakers are wrong in their 
application and use of predicates such as ‘believes’. The overall picture presented by 
Salmon is working in the right direction. Any analysis of belief contexts will leave 
some explanation to pragmatics, but will not be solely pragmatic like Soames. In order 
to present a solution, we should see whether we can incorporate something like 
Salmon’s metaphysical account of belief into the semantics of reports of belief, so as to 
eliminate, if  possible, a need to ‘fake it’. Ideally, an explanation should be given 
without making belief ternary, and give a deeper analysis than Salmon does. This is 
what I hope to do. Salmon raised many important issues for analysing belief 
ascriptions. Any analysis of belief will need to recognise these issues and incorporate 
them. Recognition and recognition failure for objects and propositions is the key issue 
in conflicting beliefs. Failure to recognise objects, individuals, and propositions leads 
to what is ascribed as conflicting attitudes, or conflicting beliefs. Failure to recognise 
an individual will result in psychological and cognitive aspects that Salmon claims are
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affected and equated with modes of acquaintance and apprehension. With the 
psychological and cognitive aspects in mind, the semantics of belief reports should 
reflect not just that a proposition is believed, but also the thought that relates to the 
object and belief for the individual. Going beyond Salmon, it might be claimed that we 
typically do not “fake it”, but instead have a convention wherein we semantically impart 
this information and are fully aware of it.
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8. Logical Form of Belief Tells it All
Beginnings of a Solution
In giving his analysis of belief, Salmon gave an explanation of the belief 
relation. He defined belief as a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a 
mode of apprehension. In doing this, Salmon ended with the claim that speakers “fake 
it” in belief ascriptions. His analysis does not match the logical form of belief reports. 
Because it does not match the logical form, speakers fake belief attributions through 
pragmatics. However, the way Salmon presents his analysis of belief allows further 
development where the logical form of the belief reports do match, and thus does not 
require faking in the way that Salmon claims is needed.
David Braun (1998 and 2002, also Braun and Saul, 2002), a critic of pragmatic 
explanation of belief attributions, claims that Salmon’s ternary belief relation is counter 
intuitive. When we think of de re belief ascriptions we do not consider belief as a 
ternary relation (1998, p. 567). Although he disagrees with Salmon on the analysis of 
belief, there is an area of common ground where both appeal to psychological 
explanations. Braun claims that a psychological explanation should be given for belief 
attributions. When Braun gives his explanation, he claims that there are different ways 
of believing a proposition. Braun is claiming that there can be two different thoughts, 
or beliefs, related to the same proposition. An individual can represent the same object 
in two ways, in turn having a belief, vis a vis an object, in two different ways. When 
this is applied to the singular proposition (1), it might be possible that that proposition is 
represented in two distinct ways:
(1) (Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening).
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Someone can have ‘Hesperus’-thoughts and ‘Phosphorus’-thoughts. If these thoughts 
are held in different ways, then that person might have two thoughts with the same 
content. Braun goes on to say that these two thoughts might take the form of mental 
sentences. In defending direct reference in belief attributions, Braun claims that an 
individual might have two different mental sentences with the same propositional 
content in her belief box. These beliefs might be ‘Hesperus’-beliefs and ‘Phosphorus’- 
belief. The two beliefs are different, even though they are beliefs regarding the same 
proposition or of a proposition and its negation.
The centre of Braun’s claim is that there are different ways of believing a 
proposition. A rational person can believe a proposition and its negation so long as the 
beliefs are held in sufficiently different ways. What are these sufficiently different 
ways? Generally, a sufficient way of believing a proposition in different ways is to 
have more than one mental representation for that object and employ those 
representations in belief.
There is an intuitive appeal in the explanation given by Braun, but it seems as 
though much more could be said about what he calls ‘ways of believing’. If Braun is 
simply claiming that the difference is the difference between ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’, then what makes his view different from the claim that there is a 
‘Hesperus’ mode of apprehension and a ‘Phosphorus’ mode of apprehension? It is not 
as simple as claiming that there are two modes of apprehension. The theory posited 
below will show this. Also, Braun does not give an explanation of demonstratives. He 
makes mention of an individual that only refers by demonstratives, but does not give a 
full explanation.
In general, Braun’s approach to de re belief ascriptions gives a starting point for 
a further theory. I generally agree with Braun and his approach to belief ascriptions, but
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find it insufficient. One of the core claims that Braun makes is that a rational individual 
can believe a singular proposition and its negation (p. 562). Braun claims that this is 
because beliefs can be held in different ways (p. 573). This point can be given further 
consideration and developed further than its current state. The use of mental sentences 
gives a good template that could be modified as empirical evidence is obtained. The 
point where I diverge from Braun is with respect to pragmatics. Braun rejects 
pragmatic solutions to belief ascriptions, but in giving a full analysis of belief, 
pragmatics will play some part, though not the part that it does for Soames or Salmon. 
Pragmatics will not have the primary role in the way Soames claims, but in using words 
to communicate, speakers have some presuppositions and intend more than what is 
semantically expressed.
In what follows, I will give the logical form of belief ascriptions. Using ideas 
such as Braun’s ways of believing, and Salmon’s modes of apprehension, I will give a 
full explanation of how individuals come to have different ways of believing a 
proposition, how they can be rational when they have contradictory beliefs, explain why 
speakers use the words they do in belief attributions, and explain behaviour in examples 
that make direct reference seem counterintuitive. I will begin by working through 
demonstratives, followed by names, and showing how in both cases the logical form of 
belief attributions can explain reluctance to make substitutions in belief attributions 
without the need to ‘fake it’.
Demonstratives as a Paradigm
In many cases, demonstratives are ignored when dealing with de re belief 
attributions. If a solution were given for demonstratives and names, it would be 
superior to one given for names alone. Although there is a clear problem for names in 
belief attributions, and until this point names have been the primary focus of this work,
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demonstratives get to the root of the problem. When someone comes to have 
contradictory beliefs where demonstratives are involved, it can be assumed that it is not 
due to a linguistic problem. An individual, i, sees an object, o, at time tj. At a later 
time, t2, i sees o again, but fails to recognise it. Because of situations such as this people 
may begin to have conflicting beliefs.
An account of belief attributions that focuses on demonstratives over names 
should show itself to be superior to a solution that is solely name based. It has already 
been shown that demonstratives and names are both directly referential terms. The 
content of neither is mediated by a Fregean sense. The problem of belief attributions 
can be engendered in both cases. Although the same is true with most names, when a 
demonstrative is used with a one-place predicate, a de re attribution is clearly made. An 
utterance of ‘That [pointing at an object o] is O ’ asserts a singular proposition 
attributing, de re, O-ness to o, which is picked out by the demonstrative ‘that’. So 
belief ascriptions made with demonstratives differ very little, if at all, from names in 
content.
Where demonstratives do differ from names is that when a speaker uses a 
demonstrative she must be acquainted with the referent in such a way that she can 
identify the referent, and is identifying the referent at the utterance. When a speaker 
uses a name, she is acquainted with the referent, but need not have the same contact as 
when a demonstrative is used. The nature of demonstrative reference is such that the 
speaker is in direct contact with the referent. Demonstratives are typically used when 
the speaker is in the presence of the referent. With this in mind, a solution that can 
explain belief attributions using demonstratives is in many ways superior to one that 
explains names alone. When conflicting beliefs are attributed based on demonstrative 
utterances, the individual was in contact with the object and failed to recognise it.
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When a solution is given for situations like this, it cannot rely on some of the solutions 
given for names. There are no linguistically enhanced propositions that can be appealed 
to, which might be combined with a metalinguistic response. It is recognition failure, 
not the failure to realise that two names are co-referential. When demonstratives are the 
focus, it is clear that we are dealing with beliefs and objects, not words. When solutions 
are given for names they cannot always be applied to demonstratives; if a solution can 
be given for demonstratives, it should be easily applied to names.
There are other advantages to considering demonstratives over names. In many 
ways, demonstratives parallel Kripke’s Paderewski example. When speakers use 
demonstratives, they use the same word to refer to different objects. In Kripke’s 
example, Peter thinks his tokens of ‘Paderewski’ are each part of different name-using 
practices and believes he is using the name on different occasions to refer to different 
people. Examples such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are cases where there are 
different names. Demonstratives and ‘Paderewski’ cases move beyond the linguistic 
and focus on the deeper problem of recognition failure. By first looking at 
demonstratives, an analysis of belief will be given such that it allows the same solution 
to follow for names.
When dealing with beliefs, some assumptions must be made. We do not have 
direct access to belief states, so we must assume something similar to Kripke’s 
disquotational principle. Kripke used his strengthened disquotational principle to derive 
the contradictions that someone such as Pierre believes that London is pretty and does 
not believe that London is pretty. Strengthened disquotation is absurdly strong.29 In 
most cases, speakers will not satisfy the requirements on the left-hand side of the bi­
conditional. Just because an individual believes a proposition, there is no reason to
29 See Marcus (1981).
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think that he will say so, and in most cases, failure to assent cannot support failure to 
believe. However, something similar to Kripke’s disquotation principle needs to be 
assumed so that we can gain access to the mental states of individuals.
Based on the disquotational principle and utterances containing demonstratives, 
it is easy to see how we can go from demonstrative utterances to belief and in turn the 
problem. When a speaker sincerely utters ‘That [pointing to Venus] is visible in the 
evening’ in context Ci, it can be inferred that she believes that that [Venus] is visible in 
the evening. Further, she believes the singular proposition (Venus, visible in the 
evening). As stated this is fine, but when the same speaker also utters ‘That [pointing to 
Venus] is not visible in the evening’ in another context, C2, we can infer that the speaker 
believes contradictory propositions. Based on the disquotational principle and what was 
asserted, it is generally claimed that the speaker is irrational, for it is assumed that no 
rational person would believe a proposition and its negation. However, our intuition is 
to deny that the speaker is irrational. It is easily understood how such confusion could 
happen, so for many the only option is a descriptive theory. The direct reference 
account of demonstratives seemed correct in ordinary contexts, but in belief context it is 
not as clear. Proponents of direct reference should be able give an account of belief 
attributions that can explain this. The first step in such an explanation will deal with 
recognition failure and explain how a rational person can believe contradictory 
propositions.
The basis of contradictory belief with regards to demonstratives is recognition 
failure, and a solution must explain this. In the above case, it can easily be seen what 
happens. Ci and C2 are different contexts with different modes of presentation. This is 
similar to the claim that Frege made, but Frege made a gratuitous move by making 
modes of presentation part of the meaning of a name or demonstrative. It can be
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claimed that there are different modes of presentation without maintaining a Fregean 
theory. The way an object presents itself to an agent will differ from context to context. 
When an object is viewed in Ci it might look fundamentally different from the way it 
looks in C2, although it might be that it is just not recognised. Direct reference can still 
be maintained in light of this, because modes of presentation are not part of the meaning 
of a term. They are simply the way the object appears at a given time.
The way an object presents itself to an agent will differ from context to context. 
Within an extended context, the way an object is presented can change. A building 
viewed before dark will appear one way. Once the sun sets, it becomes dark, and the 
lights are turned on inside the building, the building has a different appearance from 
what it had earlier. In the same way, a square building viewed from different distances 
can have the appearance of being round or square. The presentation of the object 
changes as it is approached. In all examples, the buildings can be referred to with 
demonstratives; each time the building has different modes of presentation, but there is 
no reason to see this as part of the semantic content.
Frege saw different modes of presentation as key to belief, but saw it as part of 
what is believed instead of the cause of the belief. When a speaker uses a demonstrative 
to refer to an object, and is then attributed with a belief, it can be seen what picture 
should be given instead of Frege’s. Furthermore, when a demonstrative is used the 
object is typically present; the object is seen in a particular way via an often unique 
mode of presentation. This mode of presentation is then the cause for the mental 
representation, which has as its content the object. The object has a mode of 
presentation causing the thought to have a particular form, or have information
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associated with it.30 There is now a three-part distinction: the object, the mode of 
presentation, and the mental representation.
Different modes of presentation can result in different mental representations. In 
many cases, this is not so. Generally, an individual will not have multiple mental 
representations for the same object and the different representations will be 
amalgamated into one. This is because we have a fundamental capacity to recognise 
objects. Though a person might not be able to recall the details of a journey or a face 
she should be able to recognise the journey or the face from a previous experience 
(Evans, 1982, p. 286). Though this is generally the case, there are still many instances 
where recognition fails. When we fail to recognise an object, where demonstratives are 
concerned, it is either that the object was forgotten or the object appeared in two 
different ways. When an object is viewed on two occasions and a large period of time 
has passed, the object could have a similar mode of presentation on the second occasion 
as it did on the first occasion, but the lapse in time was too great for the individual to 
remember or for numerous other reasons she thinks this is a different object. This can 
be seen with works of art. As a child, Timmy sees a sculpture, thinks it is beautiful, and 
is always talking about it, but due to the ephemeral nature of what could be called 
‘mental pictures’, when he returns to the museum as an adult to show his children the 
statue, he realises that he has manipulated the image in his mind over time to the point 
that he does not recognise the sculpture as the same one he remembers. In other cases, 
it might be that the object was viewed in disparate contexts such that each context 
makes the object appear fundamentally changed. Consider again a building before and 
after dark. If the building is a large lone standing skyscraper viewed on a clear day, it 
seems obvious that it is a tall building with unique architectural markings. But if the
30 The form o f that representation may be something like the phenomenal character o f the thought, i.e. the 
what it is like thinking o f the object.
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same building were observed after dark on a cloudy night with all its lights out above 
the fifth floor, the viewer might not be able to reconcile the two mental images created 
by these fundamentally different presentations. Not everyone presented with these 
situations must fail to recognise the objects, but it is understandable why it might 
happen.
When a speaker fails to recognise an object on two occasions resulting in two 
mental representations for the object, the speaker has two thoughts about the same 
object. At this point, there is a similarity to the view presented by Braun. An individual 
can have two thoughts with the same content. So, two thoughts can have the same 
singular proposition as their content. It is not enough for him to claim that as long as 
the beliefs are held in sufficiently different ways we can maintain rationality. A picture 
should be given from demonstrative reference to the explanation of why the speaker is 
rational when he believes a proposition and its negation. The solution Braun supports 
and the solution espoused here recognise that there are different cognitive states for 
different beliefs, even when those beliefs are with respect to the same object and the 
same property. The belief that Fa and the belief that Fb might have different mental 
states, or brain states, even though the content of both is the same singular proposition. 
In order to move forward, a further explanation should be given as to how these distinct 
mental symbols are acquired.
First, a few preliminaries. I am considering this as a primitive template that can 
be expounded upon by further research in the field of mind and thought process; it is 
open to revision as empirical data is obtained regarding mental states. If it is discovered 
that the belief that P is the brain state Q, then this revision can be added to this solution. 
We may never purge such a theory of folk psychological terms, and we may never want 
to, but a correct theory of mind and mental states should give a full interpretation of this
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template. I will be assuming as a basic form that the mental sentences are the vehicles 
of consciousness. We do not have access to the particular mental states of individuals, 
so normally there is no way to know an individual’s mental sentence. It must be 
assumed that in order to develop a theory of belief we can infer what these mental 
sentences are from their behaviour and particularly from the disquotational principle. 
Also, as a preliminary it will be important to say something about mental symbols. 
They are the vehicles of consciousness. These symbols represent the world in the same 
way as sentences and words do in ordinary language. Mental sentences are composed 
of different mental symbols forming complete or incomplete mental sentences. Just as 
natural languages have grammar, syntax, and semantic interpretation, so do mental 
sentences.
Now, consider Scott and the way he came to acquire his mental symbols. Scott 
is in the habit of going for evening walks. While on his walks he likes to look up at the 
stars. A few nights in a row, Scott sees a celestial body in relatively the same position 
and realises that it was the first one visible that evening, and on the previous evenings. 
He points at it and says, ‘That is visible in the evening’. Unbeknownst to Scott this 
celestial body is the planet called ‘Venus’. In order for Scott to arrive at contradictory 
beliefs, a few things must happen. Scott must, at some point, fail to recognise the 
celestial body on different occasion. The first time Scott saw Venus, although he did 
not know this was the planet called ‘Venus’, a mental symbol for Venus was created. 
Upon seeing Venus the following nights, Scott’s symbol for Venus was enhanced. He 
recognised it from the previous evenings. Scott thought to himself that that is the same 
star he saw last night. Each successive time Scott saw the planet a new mental symbol 
was created and tested against the previous symbol. Once Scott recognised the planet, 
the information he associated with the symbols was amalgamated. After time, the
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mental symbols might amalgamate as well. When Scott uttered ‘That [pointing to 
Venus] is visible in the evening’ he asserted the singular proposition (Venus, visible in 
the evening). He can then be credited with having the thought (2):
(2) [si Thati [=Venus] is visible in the evening].
There is a causal link between the circumstance under which an object is viewed 
and the mental symbol used for that thought. When Scott saw Venus on the first 
occasion, Ci, he created a new mental symbol for Venus. From Ci, Scott has a mental 
symbol for Venus that has as its content Venus, because Venus was the referent of 
Scott’s demonstrative utterance in Ci. Scott’s symbol is linked to Venus in the same 
way a name is linked to an object; it is a symbol, albeit mental, that represents the object 
from Ci, Venus. Scott associates surrounding information from Ci with that mental 
symbol. This information will help him identify Venus, although he will not know it as 
‘Venus’, in further contexts. When Scott sees Venus in a further context C2 and fails to 
recognise it, this will be due to his inability to reconcile the information associated with 
[Thati] and the current mode of presentation of Venus. In C2, Scott might utter ‘That 
[pointing to Venus] is not visible in the evening’. Scott has thought (3):
(3) [s2 That2 [=Venus] is not visible in the evening].
(Where the indices 1 and 2 in ‘Thati’ and 'That2’ indicate the contexts 1 and 2 in which 
the demonstratives were used.) From his utterances, and our stipulation of his thoughts, 
it can be inferred that Scott believes that Venus is visible in the evening and he believes 
that Venus is not visible in the evening. To say that Scott has these beliefs could be to 
say that he has the mental sentences with the corresponding propositional contents in his 
belief box.
31 Brackets will be used to symbolise mental sentences, unless used to give the object demonstrated in a 
particular demonstrative reference.
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The mental symbols used by an individual, having different contextual sources, 
can lead to contradictions although unknown to the individual. Though two mental 
symbols, just like words, can be anchored to the same object, the symbols can be 
disparate in function. Two of Scott’s symbols for Venus, [Thati] and [That2], play 
different roles and result in different thoughts that happen to have the same content. 
Since Scott mentally represents the object in at least two different ways, he believes a 
proposition and its negation. Just as when a name is substituted in a sentence creating a 
new sentence and those two sentences may have the same propositional content, two 
distinct thoughts can have the same content. This can lead to tension in beliefs that has 
often lead some to support the claim that the two thoughts have different contents, and 
something like a descriptive theory of content is correct. What these theories fail to take 
into consideration is that there can be different ways a proposition can be represented 
albeit the object, i.e. subject, of the belief remains the same.
The employment of different mental symbols for the same object will result in a 
belief being held in different ways. In the case of Scott, for each context, Ci and C2, 
there is a different mental symbol, [Thati] and [That2] respectively. When Scott is not 
in a position to recognise the object from C2 as the object from Ci, the symbols 
employed will have no connection to one another, and the information gleaned from 
each context will not be associated with the other context. Since there are different 
mental symbols for the same object, each caused by a different context, an individual 
can have different beliefs regarding the same proposition or object, since she can 
represent that object by different mental symbols. When de re belief reports are given, 
the speakers do not have access to the mental sentences, but they do have access to the 
objects of the belief. We know, because we stipulated, what the propositional content 
of Scott’s beliefs are. The logical form of Scott’s beliefs can be given as follows:
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(4) Scott believes that thati [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff 3m [content(m)
= (Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening) & BEV(Scott, Tml)]
(4n) Scott believes that that2 [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff 3m 
[content(w) = (Venus, not-being-visible-in-the-evening) & BEV(Scott, 
lw|)]
The logical form must contain variables as we cannot access the mental sentences, but 
do know the propositional content of the thought. Since this is known the domain of the 
quantifier is restricted to mental sentences; the mental sentence is then given its content. 
‘BEV’ is the relation such that S having p  in her belief box would be one way of 
instantiating ‘BEV(S,/?)\ So long as Scott has different mental sentences, he can have 
contradictory beliefs and still be rational. But this does not give any more information 
than Braun’s account.
The logical form of beliefs can be given in such a way that there is a distinction 
made between subject and predicate. In doing this, it should be clearer that there can be 
different symbols for the object, related to the different contexts:
(5) Scott believes that thati [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff
3a30[content(a) = Venus & content(O) = being visible in the evening & 
BEV(Scott, fo a l)]
(5n) Scott believes that that2 [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff
3a30[content(oc) = Venus & content(O) = not-being visible in the evening 
& BEV(Scott, fo a l)]
Again, when we make these attributions, it is only the propositional content that is 
known, not the symbols employed in thought. Since this is so, the domain is now 
restricted in such a way that ‘a ’ ranges over mental symbols for objects, ‘O ’ range over 
menial predicates, and ‘BEV’ is the relation such that S having p  in her belief box 
would be one way of instantiating ‘BEV(S, /?)’. Since the variables are assigned 
contents the logical form of Scott’s belief is a value assigned logical form. Such a
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logical form gives the structure and content of the belief, but does not give the mental 
sentence in the BEV relation. Since the objects of quantification are mental symbols, 
the actual mental sentence is not given in the logical form, but is instead left open 
restricting only structure and content. These two beliefs have as their content 
contradictory propositions, but Scott does not know this. There is no a priori way that 
Scott can know that [Thati] and [That2] are both mental symbols for Venus each related 
to contexts where he failed to recognise Venus as the same object in the two contexts. 
Two mental sentences can have the same content, but be different thoughts just so long 
as the employed symbols differ.
It is easy to see how Scott can believe the same proposition in different ways, 
but based on (5) and (5n) he can have contradictory beliefs, know it, but still not be 
irrational due to a minor flaw in the logical form. [®a] and [T'a] are not contradictory 
mental sentences; based on (5) and (5n), there need be no difference in mental symbols 
for Venus, yet a difference is possible for the predicates. Scott believes Venus is visible 
in the evening and that Venus is not visible in the evening, and the symbol he employs 
for Venus is the same in both beliefs, but he is not irrational because his predicates 
differ. The semantics of belief cannot be as simple as subject and predicate. Beliefs are 
complex and recursive. This should be clear at the level of logical form.
Scott’s thoughts are complex and have a structure to them. Scott has the ability 
to break his thoughts down into simpler thoughts. He can distinguish between the 
thought that an object is a red notebook, and that the same object is a notebook. In the 
way that grammar is recursive, so are Scott’s thoughts. Though we can list predicates 
as distinct predicates, it is more correct to see them through the recursiveness of 
grammar as structurally more complex. Instead of seeing predicates as completely 
distinct, more can be added. tlF a ’ has hidden structure relevant to what is believed. So,
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instead of having the predicates ‘is a man’ and ‘is a man in a blue shirt’, it can be seen 
recursively and can be expanded further so that ‘is a man with pink sideburns, a nose 
ring, and a blue shirt’ is understood through its parts maintaining compositionality and 
recursiveness. The same is true of thoughts. Scott also holds his thoughts in a 
structurally unambiguous way. Scott might try to express his structurally unambiguous 
thought that no one can get a cork into a particular bottle with the ambiguous sentence 
‘That bottle is uncorkable’. The structure of thoughts is clear to the thinker; the 
difference between [unworkable]] and [[uncork]able] is easily distinguished in thought, 
but not always in language, e.g. English. Scott’s beliefs are clearly delineated between 
his belief that the bottle will not take a cork and the belief that the cork will come out of 
the bottle. Scott is not confused about which he believes. Within this theoretical 
discussion, when Scott’s thoughts are given, and his beliefs are analysed, they should be 
given in a way that reflects the recursive and structurally unambiguous nature of 
thought.
When Scott’s beliefs are considered, they can be seen as going beyond subject 
and predicate, to the point showing each syntactic category. Scott’s mental sentences, 
e.g. (2) and (3), can be broken down further into forms such (6) and (7), which give 
their structure:
(2) [si Thati is visible in the evening];
(3) [s2 That2 is not visible in the evening];
( 6 )  [si[Np[NThat,]][Vp[vis][ a p [ a visible][PP[pin][NP[D e t th e ][Nevening]]]]]];
(7) [s2[NegIt is not the case 
that][s[NP[NThat2]][vP[vis][AP[Avisible][PP[Pin][NP[Detthe][Nevening]]]]]]].32
The mental sentences (2) and (3) are the same as (6) and (7), but (6) and (7) make
explicit the structure of the thought, or belief. Instead of giving the logical form of
32 For an explanation of these structures see Appendix A.
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Scott’s belief as a simple subject and predicate, and by quantifying over semantic 
categories, the logical form of belief attributions can be given in a way that is similar to 
thought, i.e. compositional.
By utilising the distinctions available in (6) and (7), the full value assigned 
logical form for Scott’s beliefs can be given in (8) and (9):
(8) Scott believes that thati [=Venus] is visible in the evening iff  
3a3p3y383r|3|u (content(a)=Venus & content(p) = {v‘is’} & 
content(y)={A‘visible’} & content(8)={p‘in’} & content(rj)={Det‘the’} & 
content(p)={Ncevening’} & BEV(Scott,
[si [n p [n 0 1 ]] [v p [ v P ]  [A p U y ]  [pp[p6] [Np[Det"n] [ n P ] ] ] ] ] ] ) ) ,
(9) Scott believes that that2 [=Venus] is not visible in the evening iff  
3v3a3p3y383r|3p (content (v)={Neg‘It is not the case that’} & 
content(a)=Venus & content(P) = {v‘is’} & content(y)={A‘visible’} & 
content(8)={P‘in’} & content(r|)={Det‘the’} & content(p)={N‘evening’} & 
BEV(SC0tt, [s2[NegV][s[Np[NCt]][vp[vP][Ap[Ay][pp[pS][Np[Det'n][Nfi]]]]]]])).
Here, ‘ {‘x ’} ’ signifies semantic value of the syntactic item ‘x’. As before, the 
quantifiers range over semantic categories, but are no longer limited to singular terms 
and predicates. With the structural development of (5) and (5n) into (8) and (9), the 
structure of the belief is easily seen. We are not limited to simple subject and predicate, 
but can see its structure as recursive in the way an ordinary language is. The logical 
form of belief no longer amalgamates complex structures into monadic predicates, but is 
such that it can accommodate and show complex thoughts and beliefs, and so we can 
show the two beliefs in question are contradictory.
The logical form of Scott’s beliefs was given for utterances made with 
demonstratives, which are assumed to be directly referential, but any directly referential 
term can be used in place of ‘that’ in (8) or (9) resulting in the same logical forms. 
Because the variables in (5), (5n), (8), and (9) are assigned semantic contents, these 
logical forms are value assigned logical forms. The content of the variables is assigned
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in the logical form of the utterances. As long as this form does not change, substitutions, 
which preserve semantic content, can be made salva veritate. An utterance of ‘Scott 
believes that thati [pointing at Venus at is visible in the evening’ will have the same 
value assigned logical form as ‘Scott believes that that2 [pointing at Venus at tj] is 
visible in the evening’, because the content of ‘that’ in both contexts is defined as 
Venus.
Demonstratives were used as the paradigm example of how an individual comes 
to believe a proposition in different ways. Information might be kept separate, but it is 
all thought of the same object. Initially, our concern was co-referring names. I will 
move onto names and show that the account given for demonstratives has a parallel in 
names. The logical forms of names and demonstratives will be the same, resulting in 
the basis for a solution for directly referential names and demonstratives in belief 
ascriptions. After accounting for names, I will show how the value assigned logical 
forms of belief ascriptions give an account wherein contradictory beliefs, when held in 
the right way, do not affect rationality. With this in place, I will consider cases where 
substitution cannot be maintained, give an explanation of word choice in belief 
ascriptions, and explain behaviour of individuals with conflicting de re beliefs.
It Works for Names too
We previously discussed how names refer, and how speakers acquire names 
from the social network of language users. We have seen that speakers acquire names 
and refer through name-using practices. A speaker can be a member of numerous 
practices for the same object, or individual; in some cases, she might not know that the 
different practices are all related to the same individual. The acquisition of mental 
symbols with regards to names can be seen by the consideration, and understanding, of 
name-using practices.
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In name-using practices, producers and consumers have different levels, and 
types, of acquaintance with the referent, resulting in different modes of mental symbol 
acquisition. Producers will be similar to the individuals considered with regards to 
demonstratives. They are in direct contact with the referent, so a conspicuous parallel 
subsists between names and demonstratives, but there are differences. When one is 
introduced to an individual, and presented with her name, one’s mental symbol is 
related to the individual and the ordinary language term.33 When the introduction is 
made, both mental and linguistic terms are acquired. Just as with demonstratives, 
because there is direct contact with the referent, there will be certain information related 
to the mental symbol; often, that information may come to mind when the linguistic 
term is used, due to the relationship between the mental and linguistic terms.
A producer, Tom, could be acquainted with Brian on two occasions and not 
realise that it is the same person. It may be that Brian appeared under two different 
guises, or two different times in the producers life, possibly as a child and then again in 
adulthood. As children, Tom and Brian were good friends, but as time went on the two 
friends were not as close, until they no longer kept in contact. Upon meeting in 
adulthood, neither Brian nor Tom recognised each other; they again become good 
friends all the while not realising they had been friends before. Both Brian and Tom 
still have memories of their childhood and remember the friendship that they had, but 
for some reason do not recognise one another. In this case, Tom has two distinct name- 
using practices for ‘Brian’. For each, believed distinct, name-using practice for ‘Brian’, 
Tom has a mental symbol associated with ‘Brian’. Tom is in a situation similar to the 
case of demonstratives because not only is Tom a member of the ‘Brain’ name-using
33 In cases such as this, it might be that the mental symbol just is the ordinary language term and any 
information, e.g. mental pictures, associated with the referent are associated with the mental symbol. I 
am not presenting a theory as to what these mental symbols are, just that they are the vehicles of 
consciousness.
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practice twice over, he is also associated with Brian from two extended contexts. When 
Tom met Brian the second time he failed to recognise Brian: he could not relate the two 
mental symbols he has for Brian because his observations of Brian are disparate, and the 
information he associates with ‘Brian’ from the two, assumed, name-using practice are 
not brought together.
Consumers differ from producers in the type of acquaintance they have with the 
referent, so ‘recognition failure’ might not be the best name for what happens when 
consumers have conflicting beliefs. They know the referent of a name, albeit the 
acquaintance is through the name-using practice and not the direct acquaintance a 
producer has. When a speaker becomes a member of a name-using practice, at any 
level, she acquires a new linguistic term; with the acquisition of a new linguistic term 
there is also the acquisition of a new mental symbol. The speaker associates the name 
with the mental symbol and both these terms with the referent. Where producers have 
direct acquaintance with the referent, consumers are acquainted through the name-using 
practice.
Consumers, even more so than producers, can show why an individual might 
have two mental symbols for the same individual. For consumers, it is not a failure of 
visual recognition, but, based on information gathered, reconciling information 
associated with name-using practices. Two name-using practices might have the 
different information coming from two different chains of communication. When there 
is more than one name-using practice for an individual, different names in each practice, 
and a speaker is a consumer in more than one practice, the difference in names and 
information associated with each practice might make her reluctant to think the two 
practices are for the same individual. If the realisation is made that the two practices 
have the same referent and different names, the speaker probably will not discard one
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mental symbol and use only one, but is likely to use them interchangeably, or use the 
symbol related to the word chosen when making an assertion. In many cases, for 
consumers, realising two name-using practices have the same referent will be based on 
being told that it is the case. A consumer’s place within a name-using practice is such 
that she might take one name-using practice to be two: this is what happened with Peter 
and ‘Paderewski’. To become the prime minister of Poland and draft its constitution is 
a remarkable achievement, so is being a great concert pianist. Peter thought that it is not 
likely that one person could have accomplished both. As a consumer in the 
‘Paderewski’ name-using practice, Peter considered the information associated with the 
practice and inferred that it must be two name-using practices. By doing this, Peter 
mistook one practice for two, but understandably so. Instances such as these are not 
limited to hypothetical examples, but occur in ordinary discourse.
The logical form of a belief, where the mental symbol is related to a name can 
be given in the same way as demonstratives. Consider Mary. Mary has a group of 
friends that she spends time with. Mary’s friends have another friend, Noel, whom 
Mary has not personally met, but she is an active member in name-using practices 
relating to Noel. When Mary’s friends speak of Noel they do not only use ‘Noel’, but 
also call him by his nickname ‘Leon’. Mary’s friends never clarified the point to Mary 
that ‘Noel’ and ‘Leon’ refer to the same person. The way her friends use the names it 
seems as though they are referring to two different people. When they use ‘Noel’ it is in 
the context of him as a serious logician, but they use ‘Leon’ in contexts where he is 
attributed with being an abysmal mathematician. Mary has noticed similarities in the 
person called ‘Noel’ and the person called ‘Leon’, but has no reason to think that they 
are one and the same. Mary is a member in the name-using practice for ‘Noel’ and for 
‘Leon’. With each name-using practice where she is a member, Mary has a mental
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symbol she employs in relation to that name-using practice. Mary has the mental 
symbol [Noel] with its content as Noel, and she has the mental symbol [Leon] with its 
content as Noel.34
Having two mental symbols with the same content, but not realising this places 
Mary in a similar situation to Scott. Mary has, and believes, her mental sentences (10) 
and (11):
(10) [s[Np[NNoel]][vr[vis][Npbeta]^logician]]]]
(1 1 ) [sfNeglt is not the case that][s[NLeon]][vp[vis] [Npbeta][Nlogician]]]]] 
Because [Noel] and [Leon] have the same content, Mary, just as Scott, has contradictory 
beliefs. The logical forms o f her beliefs are seen in (12) and (13):
(12) Mary believes that Noel is a logician iff  3oc3p3y38(content(a)=Noel 
& content(P)={v‘is’} & content(y)={Det‘a’} & content(8)={N 
‘logician’} &BEV(Mary, [s[Np[Na]][vp[vP][Np[Dety][N5]]]]))
(13) Mary believes that Leon is not a logician iff  
3v3a3p3y38(content(v)={Neg‘It is not the case that’} & 
content(a)=Noel & content(P)={y‘is ’} & content(y)={Det‘a’} & 
content(8)={N ‘logician’} &BEV(Mary, [s[Negv][s[NCc]][vp[vP]
[NP[Dety][N5 ] ] ] ] ] ) )
Mary’s contradictory beliefs stem from having different mental symbols for the same 
object. She was a consumer in two name-using practices for the same individual, but 
took the two practices to be for different people. Her ignorance of the information that 
‘Noel’ and ‘Leon’ are co-referential prevented her from connecting the two words and 
in turn her mental symbols. Ignorantly being a member o f two name-using practices for 
the same person or taking one practice as two are just some of the failures of recognition 
for names. The mode of acquaintance with the referent is through the name-using 
practice, so when disparate, or slightly different, information is associated with each 
practice the member might not reconcile the differences.
34 Remember, in instances such as ‘[Noel]’, ‘[Leon]’, (10), and (11), ‘[ ]’ are used to show mental 
symbols and sentences.
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Acquisition of the relevant linguistic and mental terms for each level was 
accounted for, i.e. demonstratives, and producers and consumers with names. With 
these in place, and an account given for these mental symbols involvement in thought, it 
can be explained why someone can have contradictory beliefs, but still be rational.
Rational Contradictory Beliefs
Subject to the template given regarding language of thought, membership in 
name-using practices and demonstrative experiences can lead to the acquisition of 
multiple mental symbols for the same object. By unknowingly employing different 
mental symbols for the object an individual can have more than one thought, or belief, 
with the same content, or contradictory thoughts, because the mental symbols employed 
have the same content. Speakers such as Scott and Mary have contradictory beliefs, and 
the value assigned logical form of those beliefs is contradictory. It is typically assumed 
that a rational agent does not have contradictory beliefs. Until this point I have only 
shown how an agent might come to have such beliefs; I have not defined rationality, 
given clear account of what it is to have contradictory beliefs, or explained why an 
individual with contradictory beliefs might still be rational.
When the logical form was given for Mary’s beliefs it was based on the 
interpretation for those beliefs. She believes of Noel that he is a logician and that he is 
not a logician. One of Mary’s beliefs must be false because it cannot be the case that 
Noel is a logician and that he is not a logician. Since thoughts and beliefs are structured 
in a mental language the contradiction that Mary believes can be clarified, and it can be 
shown why the contradiction does not affect her rationality. There are two types of 
contradictions that need to be considered in regard to evaluating Mary’s rationality.
One has to do with Mary’s mental processing and rules of inference, the other depends
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on the objects of thought, or possible interpretations of mental representations. The 
beliefs that Mary holds are syntactically consistent, i.e. semantically satisfiable, and 
semantically inconsistent. Given the semantics of her beliefs, her beliefs are 
contradictory. Given that Mary’s thoughts have syntax and semantics it can be shown 
that Mary is not aware that her beliefs are inconsistent under the semantic interpretation; 
so long as Mary’s beliefs are syntactically consistent and she is partially ignorant of the 
actual semantic interpretation, her rationality can be maintained.
Looking at the logical form of Mary’s beliefs can make this point explicit. Mary 
has contradictory beliefs. She has the following belief:
(14) 3v3a303p3y38 (content(v)={Neg‘It is not the case that’} &
content(a)=content(0)=Noel & content(P)={v‘is’} & 
content(y)={Det‘a’} & content(5)={N ‘logician’} &BEV(Mary, 
[si[Np[NOC]][vp[vP][Np[Dety][NS]]]]) & BEV(Mary, [s2[NegV][s[N0]][vp[vP] 
[N PbetyM ]]]]))
(14) entails that at least one of Mary’s BEVs is false, i.e. the second argument in one of 
the BEV functions represents a false proposition. Further, Mary is rational in this 
instance if (15):
(15) From (14), [si[Np[Na]][vp[vP][Np[Dety][N8]]]] and [s2[NegV][s[N0]][vp[vP]
[np[oety] [nS]]]]] are consistent, in that there is a model in which both are 
true, and 3v3a3r|30(content(a)=content(0)=Noel & content (v)=
{Neg‘It is not the case that’} & content(r|)={v‘=’}& BEV(Mary, 
[s3[NegV][s[Np[NOt]][vp[vTl][Np[N0]]]]])-
[si[Np[NCt]][vp[vp][Np[Dety][N5]]]] and [s2[NegV][s[N0]][vp[vp] [np[oety][n^]]]]] are not both
tme under the actual interpretation. Given the state of the world and the interpretation35
we have been discussing, one will be true and one will be false. But since there are
possible interpretations where both can be true, and given Mary does not fully know the
35 Interpretations, models, or structures.
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actual interpretation, she cannot be faulted in her logic. Mary does not know enough
36about the actual interpretation, but she knows enough for the belief to be de re.
The Pragmatics of Reports of Beliefs
Salmon and, especially, Soames focused on pragmatics for a solution to the 
problem of the apparent failure of substitutivity. Here, pragmatics is important, but not 
to the extent that Salmon and Soames claim. There are many cases where speakers 
express more information than the semantic content of a sentence. It is this pragmatic 
information and other presuppositions that speakers use to determine which name to use 
in a given context when there are possible co-referring terms to choose from.
On this account, belief reports are transparent. So substitutions can be made in 
sentences such as those regarding Mary, ‘Noel’ and ‘Leon’. Mary’s belief that Noel is a 
logician entails that she has the belief that Leon is a logician, because the belief is de re 
and ‘Noel’ and ‘Leon’ are co-referential. Further, ‘Mary believes that Noel is a 
logician’ and ‘Mary believes that Leon is a logician’ have the same truth-conditions 
because both statements have the same value assigned logical form.
So there must be some pragmatic parameters for names and demonstratives to 
show the difference. When considering the validity of substitution, substitutions within 
belief ascriptions can be made when it does not change the value assigned logical form 
of the belief attribution, but in some, or most, cases it is pragmatically inappropriate.
The mental symbols employed by an individual, or the way an individual x  represents 
an object o, are often related to particular words, as was previously stated. From this it 
should be clear that there are types of mental symbols, or representations. Mental
36 This account can generalize over semantic categories. It is not limited to categories such as names and 
demonstratives. This can easily be seen with noun and adjective categories. Consider ‘doctor’ and 
‘physician’. A similar account, as above, could be given for an individual that does not realize that these 
two words have the same extension. It seems possible for this to apply to all categories, but when 
prepositions are considered it seems as though if  someone does not grasp the proposition with its 
semantic value, then that person cannot be credited with understanding the utterance.
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symbols represent objects and relate to ordinary language terms. [Hesperus] represents 
Venus and is related to ‘Hesperus’. Any English speaker that can use ‘Hesperus’ will 
have a symbol of that type associated with her ordinary language term. The actual 
mental symbol representing an object and relating to a word for any particular speaker 
will differ from the symbol employed for the same purpose by another speaker, but 
there is a similarity between theses two symbols. Both symbols are tokens of the same 
type.
The way two speakers mentally represent an object in relation to a term might be 
different, but it is fair to say that they share types. We can say there are types because 
two speakers relate the same object to the same word, through the same name-using 
practice, and with that name they associate similar information. Because two speakers 
are members of the same name-using practice the information that is associated with the 
name, and in turn the mental symbol, will be similar. For each member of a name-using 
practice and name there is a related mental symbol; two speakers do not share mental 
symbols but they are tokens of the same type. Because speakers share types, there is a 
presupposition that a speaker chooses the name she does in order to elicit a similar 
representation and communicate, pragmatically, common information. These 
presuppositions explain why speakers choose the words they do when giving belief 
reports. Word choice also relates to behaviour. The person to whom belief is attributed 
having contradictory, but rational, beliefs might act contrary to what is expected given 
the de re beliefs that she has. When this is reported, the words used are relevant in that 
they express the mental symbol type that the individual has.
Like Salmon, there is a need to appeal to pragmatics to explain the hesitation to 
substitute co-referring terms in belief attributions. But this hesitation is not just a 
hesitation in these cases; belief is an acute case of a more general hesitation to substitute
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co-referring terms. For many, direct reference seems to give the correct account for 
reference in ordinary contexts, but in belief attributions, some want to reject it due to 
counter-intuitions. But there are other cases where we do not make substitutions. 
Nicknames are a clear example of this. When a speaker knows that her audience does 
not know the referent goes by a nickname, she will not use the nickname in those 
contexts. So in ordinary conversations, without belief attributions, there are two 
dimensions of terms that must be considered for communication. The speakers must 
consider their own mental symbols and corresponding terms, along with the audiences’ 
array of singular terms, which might clash with, or reinforce, the term that the speaker 
uses. Moreover, in belief attributions, there is a third dimension, since the speaker must 
consider the array of referential terms that the believer has, in addition to her audiences’ 
and her own. So the speaker must take into consideration what she wants to get across. 
Does the speaker want to get across, pragmatically, that Mary believes in a ‘Leon’ way, 
or does she want her audience to understand the assertion, where her audience does not 
know that Leon is also called ‘Noel’? This third dimension brings a further burden to 
the conversation. The speaker must choose her terms vis a vis what she feels is the most 
pragmatically germane aspect of the assertion.
Again, like Salmon, pragmatics is relevant when giving belief attributions, but 
unlike Salmon, pragmatics is playing a different role. When reporting beliefs speakers 
do not ‘fake it’. The reports are true, and BEV is a dyadic relation, we are not faking a 
triadic relation, BEL, by pretending it is a dyadic relation. So, where Salmon thinks that 
belief is a triadic, it is not. It is a dyadic relation. We do not need pragmatics in order 
to fake belief reports. We use pragmatics primarily in presupposition. Speakers 
consider the relevant dimensions in the current discourse and choose the name or 
demonstrative that is appropriate to that context.
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Behaviour
When all of this is applied to individuals, it explains behaviour. Mental symbols 
are related to names and therefore name-using practices. Information is then associated 
with the relevant symbol due to the relation between mental symbols and names. When 
demonstratives are considered there is a slightly different picture. There is still the 
creation of a mental symbol, and still information associated with that symbol. The 
difference is that there is no association with a permanent word, only the mental 
symbol. The linguistic entity requires indexing to the particular context. So the speaker 
might use ‘that’ and a description as his demonstration to refer back to the relevant 
context, e.g. ‘That man we saw in the pub last night’.
It has already been stated that different mental symbols for the same object 
result in different thoughts with the same content. These different thoughts, or ways of 
believing, will affect behaviour. A thought with content c held in way w\ will cause 
behaviour b\, whereas a thought with the same content held in way W2 might cause 
behaviour bj. This can be seen as follows. Consider Philip. Philip has a mental symbol 
ms\ with its content being object x\ he also has a mental symbol ms2 having its content 
also as x. Philip does not realise that his mental symbols are anchored to the same 
object; what Philip thinks is that his thoughts represent two different people. Both of 
the mental symbols Philip employs are associated with different name-using practices 
for*. Philip’s ms\ and ms2 are associated with the name-using practices ‘Ian’ and 
‘Martin’ respectively, so ms\ will be [Ian] and ms2 will be [Martin]. We will use ‘Ian’ 
as the primary name for x.
Ian leads a double life wherein he is a professional philosopher and hit-man. 
When Ian works as a hit-man, he goes by the name ‘Martin’, but goes by ‘Ian’
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otherwise. Philip has had interactions with Ian as a philosopher and also as the hit-man, 
but he failed to recognise Ian in both contexts. Ian has been paid to kill Philip; Philip 
knows this, but he does not realise that the man that is trying to kill him is also his 
trusted colleague. Philip has the belief he would express with ‘Martin is going to kill 
me’ and the belief he would express with ‘Ian is not going to kill me’. Using the 
preferred analysis, Philip’s beliefs can be given in the following value assigned logical 
form:
(16) Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him iff 
3a3p3y383r|3|j,(content(a)=Ian & content(p)={v‘is’} & 
content(y)={v‘going’} & content(S)={p‘to’} & content(rj)={v‘kill’} 
& content(p)=Philip & BEV(Philip, 
[s[Np[NOt]][vp[vP][vp[vy][pp[pS][vp[v'n][Np[NP]]]]]]]))
(17) Philip believes that Ian is not going to kill him iff 
3v3a3p3y353r|3p(content(v)={Neg‘It is not the case that’} & 
content(a)=Ian & content(P)={y‘is’} & content(y)={v‘going’} & 
content(8)={p‘to’} & content(ri)={v‘kill’} & content(p)=Philip & 
BEV(Philip,
[s[N egv ]  [s[Np[NOt]][vp[vP][vp[vy] [ p p [ p$ ]  [vp[vfi] [n pM ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ) )
As in the previous cases, Philip has contradictory beliefs, but is still rational because 
there are models in which both of his second BEV arguments are true. It follows from 
the interpretation given in the value assigned logical form that one of his BEV 
arguments is false, i.e. the BEV of (17). Now, Philip has contradictory beliefs, so how 
will he react when he is in Ian’s presence? Our first intuition is that he will act as he 
always does because he believes that Ian is not going to kill him, but that intuition 
wanes when the further consideration is made that his belief is de re and (18) is 
logically equivalent to (16).
(18) Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him iff 
3a3p3y353ri3p(content(a)=Ian & content(p)={v‘is’} & 
content(y)={v‘going’} & content(8)={P‘to’} & content(r|)={v‘kiH’} 
& content(p)=Philip & BEV(Philip,
[s[np[n<x]][vp[vP] [vp[vy] [ p p [ p5 ]  [ v p [v T |] [ n p [n |a] ] ] ] ] ] ] ) )
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Our first intuition then returns when the story goes on and we consider his behaviour. 
Philip is in a room with Ian, but does not leave.
Philip’s action leads us to want to say that he does not believe that Ian will kill 
him, but that contradicts (18), which again is the same value assigned logical form as
(16), and (16) is true. He does believe that Ian will kill him, but he represents the 
thought in such a way that leads him to act in a way contrary to what we might have 
expected. Further, as was previously shown, Philip has contradictory beliefs, but 
because he is employing one mental symbol, [Ian], in this instance instead of another, 
[Martin], he is acting according to his belief that Ian is not going to kill him. Even 
though Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him, he acts to the contrary because his 
belief that Ian is not going to kill him is related to the mental symbol employed, the 
name used, and any demonstrative reference in the current context where Ian is the man 
in front of him. Philip acts relative to the mental symbol employed at the time. If we 
consider Philip’s mental sentences as realised by certain brain states, each brain state 
will have a different causal role. Even if Ian were walking toward Philip with a knife in 
his hand, Philip would not run when the symbol employed is [Ian]. If at some point 
Philip is in the position to realise that [Martin] and [Ian] have the same content, he 
would then avoid Ian in all contexts. This explains why Philip might act one way when 
it seems contrary to his de re belief, but speakers discussing his situation are more 
complex.37
When other speakers discuss Philip’s situation they will use certain names 
pragmatically, but semantically they can use any name that is a name for Ian. If ‘Philip 
believes that Martin is going to kill him’ and ‘Philip believes that Ian is going to kill 
him’ have the same value assigned logical form, then ‘Ian’ can be substituted for
37 This is just a sketch of the sort of thing future semantic theories might come up with, but nothing hangs 
on this explanation for present purposes.
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‘Martin’ without changing the truth-value. Consider a scenario where someone is 
telling another, in the seminar room, that Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him. A 
helpful speaker will do what they can to convey the way Philip holds his beliefs. In this 
situation, both speakers know that Ian goes by both ‘Ian’ and ‘Martin’, and that with 
each name there is different information associated with these terms. When the speaker 
attributes belief to Philip, it would be helpful to say ‘Philip believes that Martin is going 
to kill him’, but not helpful to say ‘Philip believes that Ian is going to kill him’. From a 
logical point of view there is nothing wrong with saying the latter, but it is 
pragmatically inappropriate.
Helpful speakers try to convey the way that Philip holds his belief. When belief 
attributions are given, and the speaker knows, or infers, that Philip employs a mental 
symbol of the type that relates to a particular name, she will use that name. This does 
not give the token mental symbol employed by Philip, but allows the listener to 
pragmatically infer that it is of the ‘Martin’ type. Generally this is helpful, but it might 
still be confusing when the speaker uses ‘Martin’ and the listener knows that ‘Martin’ is 
another name for Ian. Consider the following conversation:
A: Philip believes that Martin is going to kill him.
B: Well, what’s he still doing here?
A: He doesn’t believe that Ian is Martin.
Based on B’s response, A was forced to make the germane point that Philip believes 
that Ian is not Martin. This point results in raising another problem. According to 
direct reference we can substitute ‘Ian’ for ‘Martin’, but that would mean that Philip 
now believes that Ian is not Ian!
Beliefs about Identity
Direct reference is typically credited as even more problematic when forced to 
consider identity statements embedded in belief attributions. This goes back to the
126
problem in chapter 1 that Frege considered when names are understood objectually. If 
Philip believes that Ian is Ian then he believes that Ian is Martin. This is based on the 
belief relation as a relation between an individual and a proposition. The singular 
proposition that Ian is Ian is the same singular proposition that Ian is Martin. So 
understood, if (19) is true, then (20) must also be true. Therefore, (21) must be false 
because it is the negation of (20), which is the same as (19).
(19) Philip believes that Ian is Ian.
(20) Philip believes that Ian is Martin.
(21) Philip does not believe that Ian is Martin.
According to direct reference truth is based on the proposition expressed, so (19) and 
(20) should always have the same truth-value and (21) should have the opposite truth- 
value.
In line with direct reference, we stated above that substitution in belief contexts 
is permissible, but in many cases it might not be pragmatically appropriate. When 
identity statements are embedded in belief attributions, the same should hold true. 
However, in relation to belief, there may be a difference between belief in the 
proposition expressed by ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and belief in the proposition 
expressed by ‘Venus is Venus’, or ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. The difference does not 
have to do with the semantic content of the terms but the logical form of the clause 
reporting the content of the belief. This difference is the difference between the 
property of being identical to x  and the property of self-identity. As with previous 
cases, by looking at the preferred analysis this difference can be seen.
Let us return to Philip and his alleged beliefs regarding Ian expressed by (19) 
and (20). When the metaphysics of Philip’s beliefs are given, a difference can be seen 
between (19) and (20) that does not appear when belief is simply regarded as a relation
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between an agent and proposition. Philip’s alleged beliefs expressed by (19) and (20) 
can be given their logical form as (22) and (23) respectively.
(22) 3a3P(content(a)=Ian & content(p)={v‘=’} & BEV(Philip, 
[s[n p [n O ^ ]][v p [v P ][c [n p [n ^ ] ] ] ] ] ) )
(23) 3a303p(content(0)=content(a)=Ian & content(p)={vc==’} & 
BEV(Philip, [ s [n p [n c c ] ] [v p [v P ][c [n p [n 0 ]] ] ] ] ) )
Previously the criterion for substitution was that it could be maintained so long as it 
does not change the value assigned logical form of the belief. Previous examples 
allowed this, but (22) and (23) have different logical forms. Logical form is paramount 
in determining what Philip believes. He believes that Ian is Ian. Does he believe that 
Ian is Martin? These attributions have different logical forms so it will depend on the 
logical moves that could be made from (22) and (23). The substitution of ‘Martin’ for 
the second occurrence of ‘Ian’ in (19), resulting in (20), changes the logical form of 
Philip’s belief as can be seen in (22) and (23). A further representation of Philip’s 
beliefs is expressed by (24):
(24) Philip believes that Ian is not Martin, 
which has as its logical form (25):
(25) 3v3a303P(content(v)={Neg‘It is not the case that’} & 
content(a)=content(0)=lan & content(P)={v‘=’} & BEV(Philip, 
[s i[N eg V ][s[N p [N C t]][vp [vP ][c [N p [N 0]]]]]]))-
With the consideration of (25) and assuming Philip is rational, (23) will be false and
(20) should not be attributed to Philip.
There is still a consideration that must be made regarding (21). According to 
direct reference this is typically regarded as false, but based on its logical form it may 
be true. (21) has the truth conditions:
(26) 3a303P(content(0)=content(a)=Ian & content(p)={v‘=’} & 
_iBEV(Philip, [s [n p [n C c ][v p [v P ][c [n p [n 0 ]]]]] ))
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(26) is true, if Philip does not have two distinct mental symbols for Ian. What matters 
in belief attributions is what is going on in the head of the person the belief is attributed 
to. It comes down to belief states and ways of representing the world in one’s mind.
The logical form of (26) is derived from considerations given for different mental 
symbols for the same object.
In light of these considerations, substitution can be made salva veritate so long 
as it does not change the value assigned logical form. Names and demonstratives are 
directly referential, i.e. their semantic content is their referents. However, the 
traditional claim of direct reference that substitution of co-referring terms can always be 
maintained is not correct. It depends on the logical form of the belief. Problems arise 
for direct reference in belief attributions because of a failure to consider what is in the 
head of the believer. Cognitive significance is not as important in semantics as the 
Fregean would assert, but it should play some part, which is something direct reference 
has also often failed to consider.
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Appendix A
The structures previously given in text are the compact form of the tree diagrams 
such as (1), (3), and (5) given below. These compact forms are difficult to read. The 
structure can be more easily seen in a two-dimensional tree diagram, which is then 
condensed to the form previously given in the main body of text.
(1)
SI
VPNP
APV
A PP
NPP
Det N
Hesnerus is visible in the evening 
Once the structure of the thought is given through the two-dimensional tree diagram, (1)
can be flattened and given in its one-dimensional compact form, (2):
(2) [ s i [ n p [ n  Hesperus]][v p [ v  is ][A p [A  visible][PP[P i n ] [ NP[Det the][N evening]]]]]].
The same can be done for following sample tree diagrams:
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Det N
Phosnhorus is visible in the evening
(4) [ S2 [n p [n  Phosphorus]][ v p [ v  is][ApU visible][PP[P in][NP[Det the][N evening]]]]]]
(5) S2n
SNeg
VPNP
APV
A PP
NPP
NDet
It is not the case that Phosnhorus is visible in the evening
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(6) [ s 2 n [ N e g  It is not the case that][s[Np[N Phosphorus]][Vp[v is] [ a p [ a  visible][PP[P 
i n ] [ N p [ D e t  the][N evening]]]]]]]
The tree diagram in (3) can be condensed to (4), and (5) to (6). These structures are 
based on the models put forward by Larson and Segal (1995). Their use is more for a 
semantic account of ordinary language statements, but here it is adapted to show the 
structure of mental sentences. Larson and Segal’s account is in some ways incomplete. 
Though most semantic categories are considered, some issues are left open ended. 
Questions regarding predication are not given definitive answers, i.e. it is not clear 
whether it is purely an adjectival phrase or a noun phrase. Where instances such as this 
occur, I have improvised the structure. For a complete explanation of the structures 
used see Larson and Segal’s Knowledge o f Meaning (1995).
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